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Balance of naval forces during the Cold War
Written by Sakhal
The most outstanding and divulged aspect regarding the increase of the military power of the Warsaw Pact was that referring to the Soviet Navy. This one had become a well balanced force capable of projecting the Soviet military power on the most distant places of the world. Its main weakness, the lack of air support, was being amended through the construction of aircraft carriers. On the other hand, the United States Navy was immersed in a wide program to increase the size of its fleet, until reaching a total of about 600 ships in the late 1980s. However, in the countries of the NATO the most frequent, as in the case of the Royal Navy, was the reduction of budgets. Indeed, the main problem for the West was the growing cost of the sophisticated warships, which was limiting the naval arsenal and reducing the strategic options.
United States is a naval power complemented by an Army. The Soviet Union was a land power complemented by a Navy. The allies of United States include various countries with a long naval tradition (such as Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Spain or Portugal), whereas none of the allies of the Warsaw Pact had the capability or the inclination to develop a naval strategy beyond the defense of their own coasts. This fundamental difference of perspective is central for understanding the nature of naval power as seen from either the Soviet or the western point of view. Despite the enormous structure of the Soviet naval forces which had been built since the end of the Second World War, those forces were assigned to roles which were very different to those assigned to the forces of the NATO. In no aspect of the balance of forces the numeric differences were less significant than in the naval theater. And in no other place the differences between the basic structure of the forces and in the philosophy of design of the individual units were greater than those existing between the Soviet and the western navies. A Soviet tank and a German tank would greatly resemble each other as seen by an inexpert observer, but the differences between the Kiev class and the American aircraft carriers are absolutely evident. The differences were related not only to the architecture but also to the role for which either type of warship had been designed.
The five ships of the Tarawa class granted to the United States Navy an undisputed capability regarding amphibious assault operations. They carried up to 26 helicopters and 1,800 Marines.
Geography
The difference of perspective had its deepest root in the geography. All of the countries with a long naval tradition are characterized for having a good access to the sea and also by the necessity of using it for mercantile and political purposes. The old European powers built large overseas empires and still today, when those empires collapsed long ago, they rely heavily in the sea for the importation of raw materials from their ex-colonies to supply their industries. Because of this, these countries rely on their naval power to protect their mercantile fleets. United States, whose naval forces were built for political rather than mercantile reasons, needs to dominate the sea to exert its influence in the worldwide matters and to support its allies of the NATO. No soldier based in United States, or at least its heavy equipment, could have fought outside the country if it were not thanks to sea transportation. Because of this, the naval power has always been for United States the way of being able to project its political and military power.
The Soviet Union was surrounded by land on three out of four sides and by ice on the fourth side. Its maritime position was characterized by relatively poor accesses to the sea. The history of Russia has no record of great sailors or important attempts of setting commercial routes across the sea and this country never was an overseas empire. The Russian imperialism was more concerned about creating defensive bumpers against terrestrial invasions than about conquering territories far beyond its own borders. Even in a time when the Soviet Union had assumed the role of a worldwide power and extended its political influence throughout all of the underdeveloped regions in the world, it was rare to find a base outside the area of the Warsaw Pact where the Soviet ships could be repaired or supplied in the event of hostilities.
Traditionally, the main Russian and Soviet fleets were based in the Baltic Sea and in the Black Sea, and there could be found as well the main shipyards where the Soviet warships were built and repaired. However, in recent times the importance of those two seas surrounded by land regarding naval operations diminished. The necessity of extending the defense of the Soviet Union around its periphery, to face the attack naval forces of the NATO, and the necessity of threatening the vital routes linking United States with its European allies led the Soviet Union to make great investments for the construction of bases and maintenance facilities in the Arctic Ocean, for having a guaranteed access to the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. The weather conditions in this area rendered difficult both the maintenance of the routes and the operations of warships. Ice was a fundamental problem also in the Baltic Sea and in the eastern end of the Soviet Union, where ports were free from ice only six months each year.
Isolated fleets
The worst was that, in the event of a conflict between the NATO and the Warsw Pact, the four Soviet fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Pacific) could have been immediately blocked. The Baltic Fleet could have been easily blocked through the mining of the Danish straits and an adequate utilization of air bases and light warships armed with missiles. Because of this the large missile cruisers belonging to the Northern Fleet could have been unable to access the shipyards located in the Baltic Sea, where they had been built and readjusted. The Black Sea Fleet could have been blocked by simply closing the Dardanelles Strait and the Soviet squadron operating in the Mediterranean Sea, which comprised 50 units, could have been left between the hammer of the powerful United States 6th Fleet and the anvil of the Italian, Greek and Turkish air bases, apparently without possibility of escaping. In the Far East, the Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok, a place which is naturally surrounded by the Japanese Archipelago and the Korean Peninsula, would have been very vulnerable to a blockade of the Tsushima Strait by naval forces belonging to the United States 7th Fleet.
The only important factor which favored the Soviet Union was that, albeit its geographical situation difficulted the exertion of maritime control, it had no compelling reasons to worry about anything else than the control of the waters adjacent to its coastline. The totality of the Soviet Army could be moved through land to the border with West Germany. The large mercantile fleet which had been built during the 1960s and 1970s transported cargo of other countries, for the Soviet Union had all of the precious natural resources for its own industries and those of its allies of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet war fleet, therefore, would have faced the classic mission of preventing the adversary from freely using the sea, whereas the security of the allies of the NATO would have required to maintain the control of wide ocean areas. The composition of the opposing naval forces and the phylosophy of design of their individual units matched these different requirements.
The positive side of the maritime control strategy adopted by the NATO can be appreciated by looking at the great operational range of its aircraft carrier force, which is able to strike anywhere it is required, in a totally independent way in respect of support groups. This could also be appreciated by looking at the large transoceanic amphibious fleet, which allows United States to project its terrestrial power anywhere in the world.
The other side of the coin was the necessity of the NATO of possessing important defensive forces for protecting the long and vulnerable maritime lines against the threats coming from the surface and the depths of the sea. The largest part of these missions were entrusted to Canada and the European allies, especially to the Royal Navy. These defensive missions demanded large amounts of ships and personnel from the western reserves, for eventual hostile forces could choose any place to concentrate their forces and the right time to attack. Few people believed that during a long attrition war against the Soviet Union the NATO would have been in position of providing adequate protection to the mercantile ships in every region of the world.
This infographic shows the number of warships in service in the fleets of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the early 1980s. These numbers, however, should be contemplated with a certain degree of caution, for a purely numerical comparison can never give a precise measure of the military effectiveness which corresponds to each part. In any Navy there is always a certain amount of ships which are subjected to readaptations of short or long duration, whereas others are provisionally out of service because of repairs due to breakdowns or damages. The ships could as well stay in the reserve and their availability during a crisis would depend on the time required to return them to operational status. By last, there are many large areas in the oceans which require attention. The skill and right guess in the strategical judgement provided by Admirals is decisive for placing the fleet units wherever their presence would be most efficacious. During a short war the initial position of the ships could be decisive. In this case, the aggressor starts with an advantage, for they can choose the right place and time to start the hostilities. However, the static balance shown in the graphic allows to extract some interesting information. In the first place, the countries of the Warsaw Pact other than the Soviet Union contributed to a very marginal degree to the whole of the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact, much less than what the allies of United States contributed to the naval forces of the NATO. In the second place, the absolute numbers seem to give the advantage to the NATO, but it should be taken into account that the Soviet Union had a more modern fleet with a greater growing pace.
ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare / AAW: Anti-Aircraft Warfare / SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missile / SS: Submarine fitted with conventional propulsion and armament / SSN: Submarine fitted with nuclear propulsion and conventional armament / SSG: Submarine fitted with conventional propulsion and cruise missiles / SSGN: Submarine fitted with nuclear propulsion and cruise missiles
The difference in the design phylosophy of Soviet and American aircraft carriers appears clearly in this graphic. The Nimitz class of American aircraft carriers had a basic armament of three surface-to-air missile launchers intended as anti-missile defense points. The Kiev class of Soviet cruiser aircraft carriers was strongly armed with a variety of weapon systems: two retractable launchers for SA-N-3 surface-to-air missiles, two twin launchers for SA-N-4 surface-to-air missiles, one twin launcher for SUW-N-1 anti-submarine missiles (which were fitted with nuclear warheads), eight launchers for SS-N-12 surface-to-surface missiles, two RBU-6000 anti-submarine mortars, two 76-millimeter twin cannon mountings and eight 30-millimeter single Gatling-type cannon mountings intended as anti-missile defense points.
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile / SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missile / ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare / CIWS: Close-In Weapon system
Many of the critics made against the warships of the NATO were based in the high number of weapon systems which equipped the Soviet warships in comparison with their western counterparts. These graphics show that the unbalance happened in the opposite way. The weapons of the NATO had a greater range and also a greater destructive power. This favorable situation was unaffected by the entry into service of the powerful Kirov cruiser, which was armed with SS-N-19 anti-ship missiles. It was believed that the change could happen when the Soviet Navy put into service new aircraft carriers with a displacement of about 50,000 tonnes, which was expected for the mid 1980s. A particular deficiency of the Soviet Navy could be found in long-range reconnaissance, for it lacked a system such as the American S-3A, a carrier-based aircraft for anti-submarine warfare. The Soviet Union also lacked an efficacious navigation system for submerged submarines.
Air defense areas
Regarding the Soviet Union, its strategy was intended for preventing the free utilization of the sea by its eventual adversary and this led to a totally different structure of its naval forces, which could be considered to be the other face of the maritime confrontation. The primary mission of the Soviet Navy was the defense of its territory against the marauding of adversarial aircraft carrier forces. Because of this air defense areas were created in the areas of the four Soviet fleets, through the installation of land bases for combat aircraft and the arrangement in concentrical circles of cruisers and patrol ships armed with anti-ship missiles, and supported by submarines. As the Soviet Navy grew in size and sophistication these defensive areas progressively expanded outwards, to cover large sea areas in the Arctic Ocean and the north-western Pacific. In these protected areas the submarines armed with nuclear missiles launched from immersion (SSBN), whose last models could reach United States without leaving the areas controlled by their own fleets, could hide. The secondary mission of the strategy intended for preventing the free utilization of the sea by the eventual adversary involved the attempt of controlling the open oceans, which are essential for the allies of the NATO. The submarine is the weapon used by maritime powers which are unable to control the surface of the sea. In the early 1980s the Soviet Navy had no less than 200 submarines (excluding the SSBN), of which 95 were of nuclear propulsion. The missions assigned to them comprised not only the destruction of the maritime communication lines in the North Atlantic, but also the chase of the American aircraft carrier forces before these could project their destruction power in the seas adjacent to the Soviet Union.
This map shows the locations of military ports and air bases in the Eurasian region belonging to the Soviet Navy and the United States Navy. A single icon may represent multiple bases and bases which have both naval and aircraft facilities are represented with a naval icon only. Note the distribution of bases for each of the four Soviet fleets: Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Pacific. Some friendly countries provided to the Soviet Union access to naval bases located in the Mediterranean Sea. On the other hand, after the end of the Second World War the United States Navy took control of many military bases located in foreign countries, especially in Japan as this one was a recently defeated adversary. The facilities seized in this country would provide a privileged position for monitoring or facing the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Support for submarines
The construction of the large Soviet surface fleet for anti-submarine operations (ASW) began in the early 1960s, as an attempt to counter the power of the American submarines armed with Polaris ballistic missiles, which entailed a new threat for the territory of the Soviet Union. The impossibility of localizing the SSBN, along with the imminent introduction of the new Trident missiles, which would allow the American submarines to patrol at even greater distances away from the Soviet Union, seemingly lead to the abandonment of this kind of anti-submarine naval force and its replacement by support means for the submarines themselves. Besides the defense of the perimeter of the ports which the SSBN used as their base, this support meant the attempt of forcing the barrier formed by Greenland, Iceland and Great Britain to allow the access to the North Atlantic to the submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles.
The total absence of a Soviet carrier-based air power until the late 1970s could be attributed directly to an essentially defensive maritime strategy, resulting from the prevalence of the Army over the Navy in the Soviet military mindset. The type of missions for which the Soviet Navy received authorization to build its warships were bound, directly or indirectly, to the defense of its own territory. This is evident not only because of the construction of a large number of short-range warships for the protection of the coastal waters, but also because of the type of construction of the large surface warships and the amphibious units, and even that of the submarines. The Soviet phylosophy contemplated a tight collaboration between the naval units and the land-based naval air forces, with the purpose of ensuring the dominance of their own maritime space. Because of this the surface units were bound to the land, unlike what happens with the American aircraft carrier forces and amphibious fleets.
Command structures
The different command structures resulting from these differences of naval conception were significant as well. The commander of an American aircraft carrier force would have received orders for a certain mission and from that point he would have had autonomy of decision for carrying it out in the way that he had considered to be most appropriate, taking into account to a great extent the conditions of the local scenario. A Soviet commander, on the contrary, would have been sitting inside a bunker somewhere the Kola Peninsula, coordinating a certain amount of diverse units (aircraft, submarines, cruisers) trying to achieve a saturation of missiles against his opponents. The commander of the American aircraft carrier force would have tried to concentrate his forces to provide mutual support and protection for them. The Soviet commander, for his part, would have tried to keep his forces largely dispersed, to prevent the adversarial aircraft carriers from concentrating the force of their aircraft against a few targets.
The Soviet model of naval operations was in constant mutation as new units of greater size and sophistication were being added to the war fleet. Still, the Kirov missile cruiser, which entered service in 1981, bore no more resemblance to the warships of the NATO than what the missile cruisers of the Kynda class - the first introduced in the Soviet Navy - did in 1964. Because of this, it was not expected that the Soviet Union were going to build warships with a design suitable for roles similar to those carried out by the warships of the NATO. This renders any comparison between the naval force of each side more difficult than the comparison of any other type of weapon. Ultimately, the important matter was not how many submarines the Soviet Union or the OTAN had, but which missions would have been entrusted to these forces and whether these were indeed in condition of carrying them out with sound success.
PROSPECTS FOR THE CHANGE IN 1989
The maintenance of maritime superiority is essential for the security of United States and the preservation of its security and economic relations with the overseas countries. The maritime commerce across the world is vital for the economic welfare of United States during peace time and this country, in coordination with its allies, must have the possibility of securing critical maritime communication lines during crisis moments and war times. On the other hand, the Soviet Navy had power for threatening the freedom of movement of United States across the oceans. Besides, the proliferation of modern naval weapon systems and the long-range missile systems, based in the land and air domains, provided to many regional powers the means for being able to defy the freedom of movement of United States within and beyond the international waters. For prevailing in a global conflict United States and its allies have to keep a security margin against these global threats.
The battleship USS Missouri, the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and the missile cruiser USS Vincennes navigating in July 1986 along with the resupply ship USNS Kawishiwi. The main forces which project the power of the United States Navy are the surface action and attack aircraft carrier groups.
Albeit the United States Navy alone had less warships and submarines than the Soviet Navy there are many other measurements of the maritime balance which, taken on the whole, provide a clearer picture of the actual maritime power. We should consider each of the missions and objectives of each side in relation with their respective capabilities to successfully carry out said missions and achieve their objectives when the adversary opposes them. Besides, the contribution from its allies - regarding the number of ships and support bases - was especially significant for United States. There were also several factors directly related with the potential of naval combat. These are the degree of experience regarding anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the possibility of projecting power, the qualities of the carrier-based air power, the anti-aircraft defenses (AAW), the logistic capability (including the sustainability in the sea) and the application of modern technology to every aspect of naval warfare. Geography also plays a role, as it happens with friendly countries which are no formal allies of either side but are potentially able to favor one or the other in the event of a crisis or a conflict.
Comparative maritime missions
The fundamental strategic mission of the Soviet Navy was to be ready for carrying out tactical or strategic nuclear attacks from submarines armed with ballistic missiles (SSBN) operating in protected waters near the Soviet Union. The strategic defense of maritime accesses to the metropolitan Soviet territory was central for the Soviet will of carrying out this mission. The Soviet Navy in coordination with the combined weapons of its Armed Forces would have tried to dominate the peripheral areas and key accesses to the national territory to prevent the western navies from gaining the access that would have allowed them to threaten the Soviet SSBN or the metropolitan territory. These areas are defined as "sea dominance" areas. From these areas the Soviet forces would have opposed the naval nuclear forces of United States and its allies, as well as the conventional forces which were capable of attacking from long distances, to prevent them from accessing the areas from which nuclear or conventional attacks could have been launched against the Soviet metropolitan territory. These areas could span up to 2,000 kilometers (1,080 nautical miles) from the Soviet coastline. The targets for the nuclear and conventional Soviet attacks in the "suppression of sea dominance" areas would have been the submarines armed with cruise missiles (SLCM), surface ships and aircraft carriers. The Soviet would have also tried to localize and destroy the North American SSBN in their patrol areas. Furthermore, the Soviet Navy would have contributed to the combined weapons war to defend the maritime flanks of the Army, helping this one during its advance by means of amphibious assaults, occupying and dominating the key straits and bottleneck points, and defending it against amphibious assaults which would have threatened the land operations.
The interruption of the reinforcement and resupply operations of United States to Europe and Asia would have been another Soviet objective, albeit the interceptation of the maritime communication lines and the negative dominance of the sea were missions of inferior priority for the Soviet Navy. Nonetheless, Soviet attacks against the critical maritime communication lines linking United States with its allies would have been foreseeable.
On the contrary, deterrence, advanced defense and collective security are the corner stones of the national security strategy of United States. The advanced deployment of ready-for-combat naval forces on the part of United States and its allies constitutes a visible form of deterrence in the oceans, seas and ports around the world. The naval forces of United States, by operating in a global way to support bilateral and multilateral commitments, provides a mobile and highly capable combat force which can project military power in almost any place in the world which is adjacent to oceans or seas. The North American naval forces have four fundamental objectives during peace time: to defend the continental territory of United States from attacks; to guarantee the freedom of the seas and to protect the important maritime communication lines from any adversary; to promote regional stability by supporting friends and deterring aggressions; and to act as a visible sign of the North American capability, to deal with low-intensity crises and conflicts following the briefest news and almost anywhere in the world. If the deterrence failed, the strategy of United States and the missions of the Navy would require an advanced defense of United States and its allies. The intention is to protect the key maritime communication lines, from America to Europe and Asia, to secure the transportation of commercial and war goods. To effectuate this, the navies of United States and its allies would have expected to carry out an initial campaign against the Soviet naval forces in the Soviet "sea dominance" and "suppression of sea dominance" areas. The objective would have been to eliminate the Soviet offensive and defensive capability, ensuring so the freedom of the seas for the military operations of United States and its allies while deterring the Soviet from using nuclear weapons in the sea.
The maritime balance - Trends and asymmetries
The submarine was the main platform of the Soviet Navy for both offensive and defensive naval warfare. Albeit submarines play key roles also in the offensive naval warfare of United States, it is the aircraft carrier (CV) and her support ships and submarines, forming an attack aircraft carrier group (CVBG), which constitute the main naval deterrence during peace time, either by its sole presence or through the projection of power against an adversarial force.
The aircraft carrier USS America navigating the Indian Ocean in April 1983. The United States Navy insists in the utilization of highly flexible attack aircraft carrier groups, focusing in large units with a whole flight deck, to carry out missions of presence, projection of force, dominance of the sea and attack with nuclear weapons.
The SSBN served as strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Navy, whereas attack submarines (SS and SSN) and submarines armed with cruise missiles (SSGN) were the main weapons to face the threat posed by the submarines and surface ships of the NATO, and constituted the main threat against their maritime communication lines. The Soviet force of general-purpose submarines was the largest in the world, reaching almost 300 operational units. Western observers expected that such force gradually diminished in size as the Soviet scrapped Diesel-propelled submarines of obsolete technology built in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the nuclear-propelled ones built in the early 1970s, as part of the predicted reductions of the Soviet military forces. However, these submarines had only a marginal ASW value, and many were only useful for coastal defense. Besides, the new submarines of Diesel and nuclear propulsion which were entering service with the Soviet fleets were rather superior regarding design, stealth and combat capability to those which they superseded, and they represented an important challenge for the North American ASW superiority. By last, the new submarines meant a growing percentage of modern units in the operational submarine force, increasing the overall combat potential. Even after the Soviet had effectuated their expected reductions, their whole submarine force would be two times greater than that of United States.
However, despite the concrete perfectionings of the Soviet submarine force, United States kept, in general terms, its primacy regarding the stealth of its submarines, combat systems, and systems for surveillance, acoustic detection and ASW in the high seas. The North American complementary ASW forces based in land and sea - which were constituted by P-3C and S-3A aircraft, SH-2, SH-3 and SH-60 helicopters, surface ships and submarines - possessed an ample offensive and defensive ASW capability in the high seas which the Soviet could not match. Besides, the total amount of submarines of United States and its allies was greater than that of the Soviet Union and its allies. Albeit the Soviet submarine force was supported by a modern surface fleet, the developments in the surface fleet were not as remarkable as they were in the submarine force. The Soviet focused the improvements of the surface fleet in building larger ships capable of carrying out sustained operations in the high seas nearby to the Soviet Union. The Soviet design also had a tendency to increase the fire power of every warship to the maximum, to the point of being strongly armed with multiple weapon systems and having ammunition magazines larger than those of preceding warships. These new warships were being incorporated to the Soviet Navy in considerable numbers. As the Soviet Navy scrapped the older warships, samely as with the submarine force, the modern warships represented a growing percentage of the war fleet. The result would probably be a smaller but more efficacious surface fleet.
Nonetheless, even with the new warships in service, the Soviet war fleet did not possess the capability of projecting power that the North American CVBG had. The current Soviet aircraft carrier in service and those in construction could have been capable of extending the land-based air defense umbrella, but they were not going to carry out operations for projecting power at long ranges. In the same way, the current Soviet surface fleet would have also acted, increasingly, as a prolongation of the land-based air defense system to provide a defense of greater depth against North American manned aircraft and cruise missiles. This prolongation of the Soviet offensive which expanded its defensive perimeter would have allowed to test the aptitude of United States for defending the maritime communication lines, but it also complicated the Soviet capabilities of reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as command, control and communications. Nonetheless, the anti-aircraft warfare systems of the United States Navy in combination with innovative anti-aircraft tactics, advanced missiles and coordinated air defenses, based in the land and sea domains, would have inflicted a high degree of atrittion to the attacking Soviet forces.
Future trends in the maritime balance
United States and its allies kept an advantage upon the Soviet Union and its allies in almost all of the important sectors which comprise the conventional maritime balance. However, the Soviet could have eroded some of these advantages, mainly regarding ASW, for they continued perfecting their naval forces. It was believed that the Soviet would probably surpass United States regarding the total number of surface warships and submarines, but the combined war fleets of United States and its allies exceeded the combined war fleets of the Soviet Union and its allies by far, both by the number and by the quality of their large warships.
The air defense capability of the United States Navy could have inflicted a high pace of attrition to the Soviet attacking bomber aircraft and cruise missiles. More worrisome was the wide range of Soviet systems which could have attacked, the growing escort capability of the Soviet long-range fighter aircraft and the large number of launching platforms and missile cruisers that the Soviet could have been able to gather for effectuating conventional and nuclear attacks against the naval forces of United States and its allies. Therefore, it was essential for United States to continue developing and deploying surface and submarine launching systems to deter the Soviet from attacking.
The navies of United States and its allied would continue keeping significant advantages upon the Soviet Navy regarding sea-based tactical air power, reconnaissance and surveillance, dominance of the sea, general ASW capabilities, projection of power upon the land and readiness for transferring significant naval forces to conflict points all around the world.
United States is a naval power complemented by an Army. The Soviet Union was a land power complemented by a Navy. The allies of United States include various countries with a long naval tradition (such as Great Britain, France, Italy, Holland, Spain or Portugal), whereas none of the allies of the Warsaw Pact had the capability or the inclination to develop a naval strategy beyond the defense of their own coasts. This fundamental difference of perspective is central for understanding the nature of naval power as seen from either the Soviet or the western point of view. Despite the enormous structure of the Soviet naval forces which had been built since the end of the Second World War, those forces were assigned to roles which were very different to those assigned to the forces of the NATO. In no aspect of the balance of forces the numeric differences were less significant than in the naval theater. And in no other place the differences between the basic structure of the forces and in the philosophy of design of the individual units were greater than those existing between the Soviet and the western navies. A Soviet tank and a German tank would greatly resemble each other as seen by an inexpert observer, but the differences between the Kiev class and the American aircraft carriers are absolutely evident. The differences were related not only to the architecture but also to the role for which either type of warship had been designed.
The five ships of the Tarawa class granted to the United States Navy an undisputed capability regarding amphibious assault operations. They carried up to 26 helicopters and 1,800 Marines.
Geography
The difference of perspective had its deepest root in the geography. All of the countries with a long naval tradition are characterized for having a good access to the sea and also by the necessity of using it for mercantile and political purposes. The old European powers built large overseas empires and still today, when those empires collapsed long ago, they rely heavily in the sea for the importation of raw materials from their ex-colonies to supply their industries. Because of this, these countries rely on their naval power to protect their mercantile fleets. United States, whose naval forces were built for political rather than mercantile reasons, needs to dominate the sea to exert its influence in the worldwide matters and to support its allies of the NATO. No soldier based in United States, or at least its heavy equipment, could have fought outside the country if it were not thanks to sea transportation. Because of this, the naval power has always been for United States the way of being able to project its political and military power.
The USS John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
The Soviet Union was surrounded by land on three out of four sides and by ice on the fourth side. Its maritime position was characterized by relatively poor accesses to the sea. The history of Russia has no record of great sailors or important attempts of setting commercial routes across the sea and this country never was an overseas empire. The Russian imperialism was more concerned about creating defensive bumpers against terrestrial invasions than about conquering territories far beyond its own borders. Even in a time when the Soviet Union had assumed the role of a worldwide power and extended its political influence throughout all of the underdeveloped regions in the world, it was rare to find a base outside the area of the Warsaw Pact where the Soviet ships could be repaired or supplied in the event of hostilities.
Traditionally, the main Russian and Soviet fleets were based in the Baltic Sea and in the Black Sea, and there could be found as well the main shipyards where the Soviet warships were built and repaired. However, in recent times the importance of those two seas surrounded by land regarding naval operations diminished. The necessity of extending the defense of the Soviet Union around its periphery, to face the attack naval forces of the NATO, and the necessity of threatening the vital routes linking United States with its European allies led the Soviet Union to make great investments for the construction of bases and maintenance facilities in the Arctic Ocean, for having a guaranteed access to the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea. The weather conditions in this area rendered difficult both the maintenance of the routes and the operations of warships. Ice was a fundamental problem also in the Baltic Sea and in the eastern end of the Soviet Union, where ports were free from ice only six months each year.
Isolated fleets
The worst was that, in the event of a conflict between the NATO and the Warsw Pact, the four Soviet fleets (Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Pacific) could have been immediately blocked. The Baltic Fleet could have been easily blocked through the mining of the Danish straits and an adequate utilization of air bases and light warships armed with missiles. Because of this the large missile cruisers belonging to the Northern Fleet could have been unable to access the shipyards located in the Baltic Sea, where they had been built and readjusted. The Black Sea Fleet could have been blocked by simply closing the Dardanelles Strait and the Soviet squadron operating in the Mediterranean Sea, which comprised 50 units, could have been left between the hammer of the powerful United States 6th Fleet and the anvil of the Italian, Greek and Turkish air bases, apparently without possibility of escaping. In the Far East, the Pacific Fleet based at Vladivostok, a place which is naturally surrounded by the Japanese Archipelago and the Korean Peninsula, would have been very vulnerable to a blockade of the Tsushima Strait by naval forces belonging to the United States 7th Fleet.
The only important factor which favored the Soviet Union was that, albeit its geographical situation difficulted the exertion of maritime control, it had no compelling reasons to worry about anything else than the control of the waters adjacent to its coastline. The totality of the Soviet Army could be moved through land to the border with West Germany. The large mercantile fleet which had been built during the 1960s and 1970s transported cargo of other countries, for the Soviet Union had all of the precious natural resources for its own industries and those of its allies of the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet war fleet, therefore, would have faced the classic mission of preventing the adversary from freely using the sea, whereas the security of the allies of the NATO would have required to maintain the control of wide ocean areas. The composition of the opposing naval forces and the phylosophy of design of their individual units matched these different requirements.
The positive side of the maritime control strategy adopted by the NATO can be appreciated by looking at the great operational range of its aircraft carrier force, which is able to strike anywhere it is required, in a totally independent way in respect of support groups. This could also be appreciated by looking at the large transoceanic amphibious fleet, which allows United States to project its terrestrial power anywhere in the world.
The other side of the coin was the necessity of the NATO of possessing important defensive forces for protecting the long and vulnerable maritime lines against the threats coming from the surface and the depths of the sea. The largest part of these missions were entrusted to Canada and the European allies, especially to the Royal Navy. These defensive missions demanded large amounts of ships and personnel from the western reserves, for eventual hostile forces could choose any place to concentrate their forces and the right time to attack. Few people believed that during a long attrition war against the Soviet Union the NATO would have been in position of providing adequate protection to the mercantile ships in every region of the world.
THE POWER OF THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE NATO
This infographic shows the number of warships in service in the fleets of the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the early 1980s. These numbers, however, should be contemplated with a certain degree of caution, for a purely numerical comparison can never give a precise measure of the military effectiveness which corresponds to each part. In any Navy there is always a certain amount of ships which are subjected to readaptations of short or long duration, whereas others are provisionally out of service because of repairs due to breakdowns or damages. The ships could as well stay in the reserve and their availability during a crisis would depend on the time required to return them to operational status. By last, there are many large areas in the oceans which require attention. The skill and right guess in the strategical judgement provided by Admirals is decisive for placing the fleet units wherever their presence would be most efficacious. During a short war the initial position of the ships could be decisive. In this case, the aggressor starts with an advantage, for they can choose the right place and time to start the hostilities. However, the static balance shown in the graphic allows to extract some interesting information. In the first place, the countries of the Warsaw Pact other than the Soviet Union contributed to a very marginal degree to the whole of the naval forces of the Warsaw Pact, much less than what the allies of United States contributed to the naval forces of the NATO. In the second place, the absolute numbers seem to give the advantage to the NATO, but it should be taken into account that the Soviet Union had a more modern fleet with a greater growing pace.
ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare / AAW: Anti-Aircraft Warfare / SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missile / SS: Submarine fitted with conventional propulsion and armament / SSN: Submarine fitted with nuclear propulsion and conventional armament / SSG: Submarine fitted with conventional propulsion and cruise missiles / SSGN: Submarine fitted with nuclear propulsion and cruise missiles
COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
The difference in the design phylosophy of Soviet and American aircraft carriers appears clearly in this graphic. The Nimitz class of American aircraft carriers had a basic armament of three surface-to-air missile launchers intended as anti-missile defense points. The Kiev class of Soviet cruiser aircraft carriers was strongly armed with a variety of weapon systems: two retractable launchers for SA-N-3 surface-to-air missiles, two twin launchers for SA-N-4 surface-to-air missiles, one twin launcher for SUW-N-1 anti-submarine missiles (which were fitted with nuclear warheads), eight launchers for SS-N-12 surface-to-surface missiles, two RBU-6000 anti-submarine mortars, two 76-millimeter twin cannon mountings and eight 30-millimeter single Gatling-type cannon mountings intended as anti-missile defense points.
SAM: Surface-to-Air Missile / SSM: Surface-to-Surface Missile / ASW: Anti-Submarine Warfare / CIWS: Close-In Weapon system
COMPARISON OF THE RANGE OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN WEAPON SYSTEMS
Soviet missile cruiser versus American aircraft carrier operations force
Soviet missile cruiser versus American aircraft carrier operations force
Many of the critics made against the warships of the NATO were based in the high number of weapon systems which equipped the Soviet warships in comparison with their western counterparts. These graphics show that the unbalance happened in the opposite way. The weapons of the NATO had a greater range and also a greater destructive power. This favorable situation was unaffected by the entry into service of the powerful Kirov cruiser, which was armed with SS-N-19 anti-ship missiles. It was believed that the change could happen when the Soviet Navy put into service new aircraft carriers with a displacement of about 50,000 tonnes, which was expected for the mid 1980s. A particular deficiency of the Soviet Navy could be found in long-range reconnaissance, for it lacked a system such as the American S-3A, a carrier-based aircraft for anti-submarine warfare. The Soviet Union also lacked an efficacious navigation system for submerged submarines.
Air defense areas
Regarding the Soviet Union, its strategy was intended for preventing the free utilization of the sea by its eventual adversary and this led to a totally different structure of its naval forces, which could be considered to be the other face of the maritime confrontation. The primary mission of the Soviet Navy was the defense of its territory against the marauding of adversarial aircraft carrier forces. Because of this air defense areas were created in the areas of the four Soviet fleets, through the installation of land bases for combat aircraft and the arrangement in concentrical circles of cruisers and patrol ships armed with anti-ship missiles, and supported by submarines. As the Soviet Navy grew in size and sophistication these defensive areas progressively expanded outwards, to cover large sea areas in the Arctic Ocean and the north-western Pacific. In these protected areas the submarines armed with nuclear missiles launched from immersion (SSBN), whose last models could reach United States without leaving the areas controlled by their own fleets, could hide. The secondary mission of the strategy intended for preventing the free utilization of the sea by the eventual adversary involved the attempt of controlling the open oceans, which are essential for the allies of the NATO. The submarine is the weapon used by maritime powers which are unable to control the surface of the sea. In the early 1980s the Soviet Navy had no less than 200 submarines (excluding the SSBN), of which 95 were of nuclear propulsion. The missions assigned to them comprised not only the destruction of the maritime communication lines in the North Atlantic, but also the chase of the American aircraft carrier forces before these could project their destruction power in the seas adjacent to the Soviet Union.
This map shows the locations of military ports and air bases in the Eurasian region belonging to the Soviet Navy and the United States Navy. A single icon may represent multiple bases and bases which have both naval and aircraft facilities are represented with a naval icon only. Note the distribution of bases for each of the four Soviet fleets: Baltic, Black Sea, Northern and Pacific. Some friendly countries provided to the Soviet Union access to naval bases located in the Mediterranean Sea. On the other hand, after the end of the Second World War the United States Navy took control of many military bases located in foreign countries, especially in Japan as this one was a recently defeated adversary. The facilities seized in this country would provide a privileged position for monitoring or facing the Soviet Pacific Fleet.
Support for submarines
The construction of the large Soviet surface fleet for anti-submarine operations (ASW) began in the early 1960s, as an attempt to counter the power of the American submarines armed with Polaris ballistic missiles, which entailed a new threat for the territory of the Soviet Union. The impossibility of localizing the SSBN, along with the imminent introduction of the new Trident missiles, which would allow the American submarines to patrol at even greater distances away from the Soviet Union, seemingly lead to the abandonment of this kind of anti-submarine naval force and its replacement by support means for the submarines themselves. Besides the defense of the perimeter of the ports which the SSBN used as their base, this support meant the attempt of forcing the barrier formed by Greenland, Iceland and Great Britain to allow the access to the North Atlantic to the submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles.
The total absence of a Soviet carrier-based air power until the late 1970s could be attributed directly to an essentially defensive maritime strategy, resulting from the prevalence of the Army over the Navy in the Soviet military mindset. The type of missions for which the Soviet Navy received authorization to build its warships were bound, directly or indirectly, to the defense of its own territory. This is evident not only because of the construction of a large number of short-range warships for the protection of the coastal waters, but also because of the type of construction of the large surface warships and the amphibious units, and even that of the submarines. The Soviet phylosophy contemplated a tight collaboration between the naval units and the land-based naval air forces, with the purpose of ensuring the dominance of their own maritime space. Because of this the surface units were bound to the land, unlike what happens with the American aircraft carrier forces and amphibious fleets.
Command structures
The different command structures resulting from these differences of naval conception were significant as well. The commander of an American aircraft carrier force would have received orders for a certain mission and from that point he would have had autonomy of decision for carrying it out in the way that he had considered to be most appropriate, taking into account to a great extent the conditions of the local scenario. A Soviet commander, on the contrary, would have been sitting inside a bunker somewhere the Kola Peninsula, coordinating a certain amount of diverse units (aircraft, submarines, cruisers) trying to achieve a saturation of missiles against his opponents. The commander of the American aircraft carrier force would have tried to concentrate his forces to provide mutual support and protection for them. The Soviet commander, for his part, would have tried to keep his forces largely dispersed, to prevent the adversarial aircraft carriers from concentrating the force of their aircraft against a few targets.
The Soviet model of naval operations was in constant mutation as new units of greater size and sophistication were being added to the war fleet. Still, the Kirov missile cruiser, which entered service in 1981, bore no more resemblance to the warships of the NATO than what the missile cruisers of the Kynda class - the first introduced in the Soviet Navy - did in 1964. Because of this, it was not expected that the Soviet Union were going to build warships with a design suitable for roles similar to those carried out by the warships of the NATO. This renders any comparison between the naval force of each side more difficult than the comparison of any other type of weapon. Ultimately, the important matter was not how many submarines the Soviet Union or the OTAN had, but which missions would have been entrusted to these forces and whether these were indeed in condition of carrying them out with sound success.
A British Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft overflies a Soviet Moskva-class helicopter carrier.
PROSPECTS FOR THE CHANGE IN 1989
The maintenance of maritime superiority is essential for the security of United States and the preservation of its security and economic relations with the overseas countries. The maritime commerce across the world is vital for the economic welfare of United States during peace time and this country, in coordination with its allies, must have the possibility of securing critical maritime communication lines during crisis moments and war times. On the other hand, the Soviet Navy had power for threatening the freedom of movement of United States across the oceans. Besides, the proliferation of modern naval weapon systems and the long-range missile systems, based in the land and air domains, provided to many regional powers the means for being able to defy the freedom of movement of United States within and beyond the international waters. For prevailing in a global conflict United States and its allies have to keep a security margin against these global threats.
The battleship USS Missouri, the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk and the missile cruiser USS Vincennes navigating in July 1986 along with the resupply ship USNS Kawishiwi. The main forces which project the power of the United States Navy are the surface action and attack aircraft carrier groups.
Albeit the United States Navy alone had less warships and submarines than the Soviet Navy there are many other measurements of the maritime balance which, taken on the whole, provide a clearer picture of the actual maritime power. We should consider each of the missions and objectives of each side in relation with their respective capabilities to successfully carry out said missions and achieve their objectives when the adversary opposes them. Besides, the contribution from its allies - regarding the number of ships and support bases - was especially significant for United States. There were also several factors directly related with the potential of naval combat. These are the degree of experience regarding anti-submarine warfare (ASW), the possibility of projecting power, the qualities of the carrier-based air power, the anti-aircraft defenses (AAW), the logistic capability (including the sustainability in the sea) and the application of modern technology to every aspect of naval warfare. Geography also plays a role, as it happens with friendly countries which are no formal allies of either side but are potentially able to favor one or the other in the event of a crisis or a conflict.
Comparative maritime missions
The fundamental strategic mission of the Soviet Navy was to be ready for carrying out tactical or strategic nuclear attacks from submarines armed with ballistic missiles (SSBN) operating in protected waters near the Soviet Union. The strategic defense of maritime accesses to the metropolitan Soviet territory was central for the Soviet will of carrying out this mission. The Soviet Navy in coordination with the combined weapons of its Armed Forces would have tried to dominate the peripheral areas and key accesses to the national territory to prevent the western navies from gaining the access that would have allowed them to threaten the Soviet SSBN or the metropolitan territory. These areas are defined as "sea dominance" areas. From these areas the Soviet forces would have opposed the naval nuclear forces of United States and its allies, as well as the conventional forces which were capable of attacking from long distances, to prevent them from accessing the areas from which nuclear or conventional attacks could have been launched against the Soviet metropolitan territory. These areas could span up to 2,000 kilometers (1,080 nautical miles) from the Soviet coastline. The targets for the nuclear and conventional Soviet attacks in the "suppression of sea dominance" areas would have been the submarines armed with cruise missiles (SLCM), surface ships and aircraft carriers. The Soviet would have also tried to localize and destroy the North American SSBN in their patrol areas. Furthermore, the Soviet Navy would have contributed to the combined weapons war to defend the maritime flanks of the Army, helping this one during its advance by means of amphibious assaults, occupying and dominating the key straits and bottleneck points, and defending it against amphibious assaults which would have threatened the land operations.
The interruption of the reinforcement and resupply operations of United States to Europe and Asia would have been another Soviet objective, albeit the interceptation of the maritime communication lines and the negative dominance of the sea were missions of inferior priority for the Soviet Navy. Nonetheless, Soviet attacks against the critical maritime communication lines linking United States with its allies would have been foreseeable.
On the contrary, deterrence, advanced defense and collective security are the corner stones of the national security strategy of United States. The advanced deployment of ready-for-combat naval forces on the part of United States and its allies constitutes a visible form of deterrence in the oceans, seas and ports around the world. The naval forces of United States, by operating in a global way to support bilateral and multilateral commitments, provides a mobile and highly capable combat force which can project military power in almost any place in the world which is adjacent to oceans or seas. The North American naval forces have four fundamental objectives during peace time: to defend the continental territory of United States from attacks; to guarantee the freedom of the seas and to protect the important maritime communication lines from any adversary; to promote regional stability by supporting friends and deterring aggressions; and to act as a visible sign of the North American capability, to deal with low-intensity crises and conflicts following the briefest news and almost anywhere in the world. If the deterrence failed, the strategy of United States and the missions of the Navy would require an advanced defense of United States and its allies. The intention is to protect the key maritime communication lines, from America to Europe and Asia, to secure the transportation of commercial and war goods. To effectuate this, the navies of United States and its allies would have expected to carry out an initial campaign against the Soviet naval forces in the Soviet "sea dominance" and "suppression of sea dominance" areas. The objective would have been to eliminate the Soviet offensive and defensive capability, ensuring so the freedom of the seas for the military operations of United States and its allies while deterring the Soviet from using nuclear weapons in the sea.
The maritime balance - Trends and asymmetries
The submarine was the main platform of the Soviet Navy for both offensive and defensive naval warfare. Albeit submarines play key roles also in the offensive naval warfare of United States, it is the aircraft carrier (CV) and her support ships and submarines, forming an attack aircraft carrier group (CVBG), which constitute the main naval deterrence during peace time, either by its sole presence or through the projection of power against an adversarial force.
The aircraft carrier USS America navigating the Indian Ocean in April 1983. The United States Navy insists in the utilization of highly flexible attack aircraft carrier groups, focusing in large units with a whole flight deck, to carry out missions of presence, projection of force, dominance of the sea and attack with nuclear weapons.
The SSBN served as strategic offensive weapons of the Soviet Navy, whereas attack submarines (SS and SSN) and submarines armed with cruise missiles (SSGN) were the main weapons to face the threat posed by the submarines and surface ships of the NATO, and constituted the main threat against their maritime communication lines. The Soviet force of general-purpose submarines was the largest in the world, reaching almost 300 operational units. Western observers expected that such force gradually diminished in size as the Soviet scrapped Diesel-propelled submarines of obsolete technology built in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the nuclear-propelled ones built in the early 1970s, as part of the predicted reductions of the Soviet military forces. However, these submarines had only a marginal ASW value, and many were only useful for coastal defense. Besides, the new submarines of Diesel and nuclear propulsion which were entering service with the Soviet fleets were rather superior regarding design, stealth and combat capability to those which they superseded, and they represented an important challenge for the North American ASW superiority. By last, the new submarines meant a growing percentage of modern units in the operational submarine force, increasing the overall combat potential. Even after the Soviet had effectuated their expected reductions, their whole submarine force would be two times greater than that of United States.
However, despite the concrete perfectionings of the Soviet submarine force, United States kept, in general terms, its primacy regarding the stealth of its submarines, combat systems, and systems for surveillance, acoustic detection and ASW in the high seas. The North American complementary ASW forces based in land and sea - which were constituted by P-3C and S-3A aircraft, SH-2, SH-3 and SH-60 helicopters, surface ships and submarines - possessed an ample offensive and defensive ASW capability in the high seas which the Soviet could not match. Besides, the total amount of submarines of United States and its allies was greater than that of the Soviet Union and its allies. Albeit the Soviet submarine force was supported by a modern surface fleet, the developments in the surface fleet were not as remarkable as they were in the submarine force. The Soviet focused the improvements of the surface fleet in building larger ships capable of carrying out sustained operations in the high seas nearby to the Soviet Union. The Soviet design also had a tendency to increase the fire power of every warship to the maximum, to the point of being strongly armed with multiple weapon systems and having ammunition magazines larger than those of preceding warships. These new warships were being incorporated to the Soviet Navy in considerable numbers. As the Soviet Navy scrapped the older warships, samely as with the submarine force, the modern warships represented a growing percentage of the war fleet. The result would probably be a smaller but more efficacious surface fleet.
Nonetheless, even with the new warships in service, the Soviet war fleet did not possess the capability of projecting power that the North American CVBG had. The current Soviet aircraft carrier in service and those in construction could have been capable of extending the land-based air defense umbrella, but they were not going to carry out operations for projecting power at long ranges. In the same way, the current Soviet surface fleet would have also acted, increasingly, as a prolongation of the land-based air defense system to provide a defense of greater depth against North American manned aircraft and cruise missiles. This prolongation of the Soviet offensive which expanded its defensive perimeter would have allowed to test the aptitude of United States for defending the maritime communication lines, but it also complicated the Soviet capabilities of reconnaissance and surveillance, as well as command, control and communications. Nonetheless, the anti-aircraft warfare systems of the United States Navy in combination with innovative anti-aircraft tactics, advanced missiles and coordinated air defenses, based in the land and sea domains, would have inflicted a high degree of atrittion to the attacking Soviet forces.
CONSTRUCTION OF WARSHIPS
Warsaw Pact and NATO
Warsaw Pact and NATO
| Type of Equipment | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Ships | USSR: 9 Allies: 2 |
USSR: 8 Allies: 4 |
USSR: 9 Allies: 3 |
| Submarines | USSR: 8 Allies: 0 |
USSR: 9 Allies: 0 |
USSR: 9 Allies: 0 |
| Type of Equipment | 1986 | 1987 | 1988 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Capital Ships | USA: 5 Allies: 7 |
USA: 6 Allies: 8 |
USA: 3 Allies: 10 |
| Submarines | USA: 3 Allies: 3 |
USA: 2 Allies: 4 |
USA: 5 Allies: 6 |
Future trends in the maritime balance
United States and its allies kept an advantage upon the Soviet Union and its allies in almost all of the important sectors which comprise the conventional maritime balance. However, the Soviet could have eroded some of these advantages, mainly regarding ASW, for they continued perfecting their naval forces. It was believed that the Soviet would probably surpass United States regarding the total number of surface warships and submarines, but the combined war fleets of United States and its allies exceeded the combined war fleets of the Soviet Union and its allies by far, both by the number and by the quality of their large warships.
The air defense capability of the United States Navy could have inflicted a high pace of attrition to the Soviet attacking bomber aircraft and cruise missiles. More worrisome was the wide range of Soviet systems which could have attacked, the growing escort capability of the Soviet long-range fighter aircraft and the large number of launching platforms and missile cruisers that the Soviet could have been able to gather for effectuating conventional and nuclear attacks against the naval forces of United States and its allies. Therefore, it was essential for United States to continue developing and deploying surface and submarine launching systems to deter the Soviet from attacking.
The navies of United States and its allied would continue keeping significant advantages upon the Soviet Navy regarding sea-based tactical air power, reconnaissance and surveillance, dominance of the sea, general ASW capabilities, projection of power upon the land and readiness for transferring significant naval forces to conflict points all around the world.
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The Soviet Navy - Surface Ships
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The Soviet Navy - SLBM
Cold War NATO navies - Aircraft Carriers
Cold War NATO navies - Surface Ships
Cold War NATO navies - Submarines
Cold War NATO navies - SLBM
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Website: Military History
Article submitted: 2025-01-17
Article updated: 0000-00-00
E-mail:
Website: Military History
Article submitted: 2025-01-17
Article updated: 0000-00-00


















