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Cold War NATO navies - Aircraft carriers


Written by Sakhal

The naval attack capability of the NATO was centered in the twelve American large aircraft carriers. After the ending of the American military operations in South-East Asia in the early 1970s a system was established, in virtue of which two aircraft carriers were transferred from the Atlantic Fleet to the Mediterranean 6th Fleet and another two from the Pacific Fleet to the West Pacific 7th Fleet.

The USS Midway had her effective base in Yokosuka (Japan) while rotating in six-month deployment periods. In the early 1980s the recent events in Middle East altered this scheme, and thus one of the two aircraft carriers belonging to the 6th Fleet along with another one belonging to the 7th Fleet were transferred to the Indian Ocean. The demands imposed by the new geo-strategic compromises about the available force advised to increase the aircraft carrier force from twelve to fifteen units.

The NATO's come-and-go strategy

In the event of a conflict between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the aircraft carriers belonging to the 2nd Fleet would have constituted the core of the very important Atlantic Fleet. Two or three aircraft carriers would have been available within a relatively short term after news about the eventuality of the conflict existed, whereas the other two would have been subjected to readjust or maintenance tasks. These could have been later reinforced through the transfer of another two aircraft carriers belonging to the 3rd Fleet from the United States western coast, as part of the so-called "come-and-go strategy". This disposition, however, did not lack important weaknesses, given that it relied in the readiness status of the warships, for these were too wide to cross the Panama Canal.

The probable missions of the aircraft carriers belonging to the 2nd Fleet would have included the coverage of the amphibious operations in the NATO's northern flank, the elimination of the Soviet surface naval units which could have departed to oppose the landings, the attacks against Soviet military targets in the Kola Peninsula, the support to the surface naval forces which held the anti-submarine barrier between Greenland, Iceland and Great Britain, and by last the remote coverage of the military convoys crossing the Atlantic Ocean.

The aircraft carriers belonging to the 6th Fleet would have tried to eliminate the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet and could have supported amphibious landings in the NATO's southern flank.

uss_nimitz_aircraft_carrier_with_supply_ship.jpg

The USS Nimitz navigating alongside a supply ship. The aircraft on the flight deck are F-4 Phantom, LTV A-7 Corsair II, A-6 Intruder and E-2 Hawkeye.

The possibilities of an offensive campaign in the north-western Pacific Ocean against the Soviet fleet based in Vladivostok would have depended a lot on how many aircraft carriers were available after having transferred part of the force to the Atlantic Fleet. But a combat force which included two aircraft carriers and were placed right in the external end of the Japanese Archipelago would have meant a serious concern for the commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

The aircraft carriers

The offensive power of the American aircraft carriers was based on their three attack squadrons. Two of them were equipped with twelve A-7 Corsair light ground-strike aircraft and the third one was formed by ten A-6 Intruder all-weather ground-strike aircraft, supported by a detachment of four A-6 tanker aircraft. Both the A-7 and the A-6 could effectuate strike missions in places located at distances beyond 500 nautical miles (926 kilometers) from their aircraft carriers. On these missions they could be accompanied by an EA-6 electronic-countermeasure aircraft, whose role would be to interfere the enemy radar emissions to reduce the effectiveness of the defense missile systems.

If there were no assistance from other information sources, the enemy surface naval forces would be detected by one of the four E-2 Hawkeye early-warning aircraft, which are equipped with a very effective search radar, whose antenna rotates inside a lentil-shaped housing. These aircraft would also alert in the event of an aerial attack, which should be intercepted by the aforementioned two squadrons of twelve fighter-bomber aircraft carried onboard the aircraft carriers. Some of the oldest American aircraft carriers still used the F-4 Phantom as their interceptor fighter aircraft, whereas the most modern ones were equipped with the much more perfected F-14 Tomcat. Fitted with a radar which was almost immune to interferences and capable of simultaneously managing twenty-four different targets, the F-14 could fire six AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles almost simultaneously with a good probability of success against enemy aircraft located to distances of 111 to 185 kilometers.

grumman_f-14_tomcat_and_aim-54a_phoenix.jpg


Another important incorporation to the carrier-based air wing was a squadron of ten S-3 Viking anti-submarine aircraft, which allowed the aircraft carrier to deploy a long-range capability against the Soviet submarines. Because of their ability for effectuating long-range patrols, these aircraft could quickly give a response to the data provided by passive detection systems, such as the SOSUS, a NATO submarine hydrophone system which surrounds the North Atlantic and was a vital part of the Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain anti-submarine barrier, and the new systems of towed detectors which began to enter service in the early 1980s. The S-3 would promptly try to localize the exact position of the enemy submarine, by using sonobuoys and their own sophisticated data processing systems. By last, they would attack the target by means of target-seeking torpedoes or depth charges. For shorter distances, the anti-submarine defense patrol would use SH-3 Sea King helicopters, of which aircraft carriers transported squadrons of six units.

lockheed_s-3a_viking.jpg

The Lockheed S-3A Viking was the most modern anti-submarine patrol bomber aircraft which operated from the American aircraft carriers.

Soviet countermeasures

Evidently, if a conflict had started the American aircraft carriers would have been the main target of the Soviet Navy. Lacking their own carrier-based air wing, the Soviet had developed a variety of countermeasures for facing the threat that the American aircraft carriers posed. In the vicinity of the area of operations of each of the four Soviet fleets, a large force of land-based naval bombers armed with missiles had been concentrated. In the early 1980s the new Tu-22 Backfire long-range bomber aircraft was being deployed in significant amounts. The American aircraft carriers would have been located by means of the Soviet Ocean Surveillance System, whose data was obtained by means of spy satellites and long-range reconnaissance aircraft.

In the Mediterranean Sea, the American aircraft carriers belonging to the 6th Fleet were subject to a severe and constant tracking by especially modified Soviet destroyers, armed with four surface-to-surface missiles with a range of 20 nautical miles (32 kilometers). During a conflict these warships would have been placed in an optimal position for a pre-emptive attack.

By last, the Soviet Navy had built a fleet of about 60 submarines armed with cruise missiles, of which 45 were propelled by nuclear energy. The oldest submarines were armed with long-range missiles which required a mid-course guidance system and had to be fired from the surface. However, the fifteen submarines of the Charlie class, of which the vast majority operated with the Northern Fleet, were armed with missiles of shorter range which could be fired underwater and would have allowed a very short alarm timespan.

In the event of a Soviet attack performed by land-based bomber aircraft, the American aircraft carriers would have relied almost wholly in the E-2 Hawkeye to allow the F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft to intercept the attackers before these had launched their missiles. The E-2 would be placed at a distance of 90 to 180 kilometers from the aircraft carrier, in the direction from which an eventual attack was expected, and with the air combat patrol nearby and ready to act. Thanks to their Phoenix air-to-air long-range missiles, the F-14 could have hit the attacking aircraft at a distance of 280 to 370 kilometers from the aircraft carrier, a distance greater than the range of the AS-6 Kingfish missiles carried by the Tu-22 bomber aircraft, so if the defensive action were successful the aircraft carrier would stay outside the range of the enemy weapons.

In the early 1980s it was believed that the Soviet had in development an air-to-surface missile which could reach a distance of 926 kilometers flying at a speed of 3.3 Mach, to allow the Tu-22 to attack the aircraft carriers from outside their air defense perimeter. However, the Phoenix missiles also had a good capability as anti-missile weapons.

uss_constellation_with_uss_leahy_and_uss_niagara_falls.jpg

The USS Constellation and the missile cruiser USS Leahy photographed in 1979, while navigating in the South China Sea along with the supply ship USS Niagara Falls, during maneuvers with the Task Force 77.7.

Any aircraft appearing in the screen of the fighter aircraft would be within the radius of the air defense missile system of the cruisers and escort destroyers. However, the defense against missiles would be entrusted to the anti-missile defense cannon and missile systems of the particular warship which were subject to the attack, besides the important electronic countermeasures. What is clear is that from the very beginning of the conflict forth the Soviet Navy would have done anything possible to sink or put out of action the American aircraft carriers, whenever these were located. They would not have to wait for the aircraft carriers to get close to their bases. In principle, the initial threat would come from the submarines which followed the aircraft carriers and, in the Mediterranean Sea, from the surface naval units which fulfilled the same role. Both types of ships were armed with short-range cruise missiles which could attack suddenly and would have allowed a very short alarm timespan.

It is difficult to predict the result of such an attack, for it would depend on diverse variables, such as the number of missiles launched and the relative effect of the electronic countermeasures. Even the impact from a surface-to-surface missile would not guarantee that a large aircraft carrier would be put out of service. The damage caused would depend on where the missile had hit and whether there were nearby aircraft or fuel trucks.

After the first hours of the conflict the threat against the aircraft carriers would begin to decrease and these warships would have a reasonable hope of localizing and sinking the nuclear-propelled submarines armed with cruise missiles (SSNG) which approached them, especially if they moved at high speed, which would render them much more audible for the passive detection systems.

Multiple threats

The main threat would have materialized if the Atlantic Fleet had tried to enter the Norwegian Sea, as it would surely have happened if Marines were to be sent to Norway. Prolonged operations in this hostile area could have inflicted a serious attrition to the carrier-based aircraft, so a minumum of two or three aircraft carrier forces would have been required to carry out that task. Furthermore, the environment could have gradually become more hostile as the aircraft carriers operated closer to the Norwegian coast. The Soviet Navy could have been forced to send all of its forces to the battle if the Kola Peninsula had been threatened. The aircraft carrier force would not have had to face a more or less manageable attack from naval bomber aircraft, but waves of aerial attacks gradually increasing their intensity and frequency due to the proximity to the Soviet bases. The submarines armed with torpedoes and missiles would have been aligned in front of the advance route of the aircraft carriers, being less detectable because they would have been patrolling at low speed and, hence, emitting less noise. And the missile cuisers of the Kresta class, supported by smaller missile warships, would have surrounded the North Cape waiting for the right time to launch the attack.

The aircraft carriers could have been warned about the aerial attacks by means of the NADGE radar system and the AWACS aircraft which were patrolling the area. Probably, the fighter aircraft based in Norwegian airbases could have shot down some of the bomber aircraft before these had reached the defense perimeter of the aircraft carriers. However, the massive attacks launched from diverse bases would have continued constituting the greatest threat.

US NAVY AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
in service circa 1980


Atlantic Fleet (2nd/6th Fleet)

Name Propulsion Commission Date
USS Eisenhower Nuclear 1977
USS Nimitz Nuclear 1975
USS John F. Kennedy Nuclear 1968
USS America Nuclear 1965
USS Independence Conventional 1959
USS Saratoga Conventional 1956
USS Forrestal Conventional 1955


Pacific Fleet (3rd/7th Fleet)

Name Propulsion Commission Date
USS Enterprise Nuclear 1961
USS Constellation Nuclear 1961
USS Kitty Hawk Nuclear 1961
USS Ranger Conventional 1957
USS Midway Conventional 1945


Besides the attack squadrons of the aircraft carriers, in the early 1980s there existed in Europe a certain number of land-based aircraft assigned to maritime combat missions. The area of the North Sea was covered by a Blackburn Buccaneer squadron of the Royal Air Force based in East Anglia and two squadrons of thirty F-104 Starfighter of the German Air Force - which would soon be replaced by the much more effective Panavia Tornado - based in the north of the Jutland province. The German aircraft were equipped with the powerful AS.34 Kormoran anti-ship missile. Their position also allowed them to effectively cover the areas of approximation to the Baltic Sea, where they would have played a key role in the event of an amphibious assault from the Warsaw Pact forces. By last, there existed in the northern flank of Norway another squadron of F-104 fighter aircraft for maritime combat, based in Bodo.

The largest part of the NATO aerial squadrons assigned to maritime missions were adscribed to long-range anti-submarine patrol missions. The United States Navy had twenty-four P-3 Orion squadrons, plus another thirteen in the reserve. Thirteen of the first-line squadrons had their base in the eastern coast of United States, and were regularly deployed in Sigonella (Sicily) and Keflavik (Iceland). The squadrons based in the western coast were deployed in Hawaii and Japan. Spain, Netherlands and Norway also used the P-3 and Canada was building a P-3 version with its own specifications, called Aurora. Great Britain had four Hawker Siddeley Nimrod squadrons, of which three were based in Scotland while the other covered the south-western approximation area. Other NATO countries used the French long-range reconnaissance aircraft Breguet Br.1150 Atlantic.

These aircraft were equipped with diverse systems of acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, low-light television cameras, infrared sensors and magnetic anomaly sensors. The Nimrod and Orion carried as well the most modern data processing systems for analyzing the information provided by their sonobuoys, which would allow them to quickly effectuate an attack. The armament usually comprised depth charges and target-seeking torpedoes but they could carry as well anti-ship missiles, useful against surface targets.

The NATO long-range maritime patrol aircraft, operating jointly with detection systems such as the SOSUS, could have played a good role in reducing the threat posed by the Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic. However, their dependency on the SOSUS system for the initial "contacts" would have meant that the SOSUS terminals themselves could have become a target during the initial stages of a conflict, which could have rendered these information sources silent from that time forth.

After the scrapping of the HMS Ark Royal, the Royal Navy stopped using aircraft carriers endowed with maritime combat capability. The new aircraft carrier of the Invincible class, whose first unit was completed in 1980 and followed by another two, was designed to serve as the operations base of nine WS-61 Sea King anti-submarine helicopters and five British Aerospace Sea Harrier V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing) aircraft, albeit it is probable that these numbers would have been increased in the event of a war, as it happened during the Falklands War. The Sea Harrier were the last incorporation to the complement of aircraft provided for the aircraft carriers of the Invincible class, and they had a reasonable capability for short-range combat, especially after the incorporation of a new take-off system which allowed to increase their payload. However, this aircraft had very limited capabilities as an interceptor fighter. The aircraft carrier HMS Hermes, which served as flagship during the Falklands War, remained in service with a similar air wing until 1984, one year before the third unit of the Invincible class entered service.

hms_ark_royal_with_harrier_vstol.jpg

A British Aerospace Sea Harrier V/STOL aircraft performing flight trials on the flight deck of HMS Ark Royal (withdrawn from active service in the late 1970s). The Sea Harrier could operate from light aircraft carriers, which allowed medium-size fleets to operate with carrier-based ground-strike aircraft.

hms_hermes_aircraft_carrier.jpg

HMS Hermes navigating across rough sea in the South Atlantic. In such conditions only the Sea Harrier could operate.

The role for which the Invincible class was designed and superbly equipped was that of anti-submarine patrol in the Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain perimeter. These aircraft carriers were fitted with a multi-code sonar, which was comparable to that used by the most modern warships of the United States Navy, as well as an excellent data processing system and integrated anti-submarine control facilities. However, the position of these aircraft carriers in the Greenland-Iceland-Great Britain perimeter would have been sustainable as long as there were American aircraft carriers in the area, for these would have kept at bay the Soviet surface units armed with anti-ship missiles.

Albeit the aircraft carriers of the Invincible class constituted high-value targets, it is unlikey that they would have attracted the interest of the Soviet bomber aircraft as much as the American aircraft carriers would have, or that they would have had to operate in areas as hostile as those where the latter would have to. To protect themselves from aerial attacks, the aircraft carriers of the Invincible class would have had to rely on their Sea Dart air defense missile system and probably also on the air defense systems existing in the escorting destroyers. The Sea Harrier would have had to face only the enemy reconnaissance aircraft.

invincible_class_aircraft_carriers.jpg

HMS Illustrious navigating alongside HMS Invincible near the Falkland Islands. Boths ships are escorted by the missile destroyer HMS Bristol.

In the Mediterranean Sea, the Italian Navy was building the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, intended to effectuate anti-submarine missions similarly as how the Invincible class would have done. It also had the older Vittorio Veneto, a hybrid cruiser/helicopter carrier which was fitted with a medium-range defense missile system, among other weapon systems, and a stern flight deck and hangar for nine Agusta-Bell AB-212 anti-submarine helicopters. Albeit still useful, this warship was not comparable to those of the Invincible class due to the short operational range of the helicopters that she carried, her older sonar and her data processing system of inferior grade.

vittorio_veneto_helicopter_carrier.jpg

The Vittorio Veneto carried nine helicopters astern and could fire ASROC ASM (anti-submarine) and "Terrier" SAM (surface-to-air) missiles from a twin launcher installed in the forecastle.

France, which in the late 1960s decided to withdraw from the NATO command structure, pursued a naval policy dictated by national demands rather than by the requirements of the NATO. It had in service the attack aircraft carriers Foch and Clemenceau, which were much smaller than the American counterparts. Their reduced size made impossible that they could carry the most modern fighter and ground-strike aircraft, which were larger than their predecessors. They usually carried a fighter squadron comprising ten outdated F-8 Crusader (whose main limitation was the lack of modern avionics), two fighter-bomber squadrons of Super Étendard (aircraft of national construction with capability for carrying conventional and nuclear drop weapons) and an anti-submarine squadron comprising a certain number of outdated Breguet Br.1050 Alizé aircraft, complemented by two helicopters.

foch_aircraft_carrier.jpg

The Foch navigating with multiple Dassault Super Étendard aircraft parked throughout her flight deck and one Breguet Alizé parked astern.

In the early 1980s only the Clemenceau operated as an attack aircraft carrier, whereas the Foch operated as a helicopter carrier. The withdrawal of one of the American aircraft carriers from the Mediterranean Sea conferred greater importance to the French aircraft carriers within the NATO. France also had a helicopter carrier, the Jean d'Arc, which conceptually speaking was not very different from the Italian counterpart Vittorio Veneto. She was armed with four 100-millimeter cannons and six Exocet anti-ship missiles, and had a stern flight deck and underdeck hangar for eight SA-321 Super Frelon anti-submarine helicopters.

arc_helicopter_carrier.jpg

The French helicopter carrier Jean d'Arc. Starting in the 1960s, some leading navies experimented with helicopter carrier cruisers. Albeit these hybrid warships were soon deemed to be unefficient, because they fell short in either role (carrier and cruiser), the more modern amphibious assault ships owe much to their concept.

Aircraft carriers are particularly vulnerable to the effects from nuclear weapons, because the flight deck and the aircraft would suffer damages from the blast wave, even if the explosion took place several miles away. Because of this, the effectiveness of the NATO aircraft carriers would be significantly reduced if an eventual conflict escalated to the point of becoming an exchange of tactical nuclear bombs.

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Cold War NATO navies - Surface ships

Cold War NATO navies - Submarines

Cold War NATO navies - SLBM

Categories: Ships - Aviation - Cold War - 20th Century - [General]

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Website: Military History

Article submitted: 2025-02-11

Article updated: 0000-00-00


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