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The sinking of the Yamato and the Musashi


Written by Sakhal

In January 1930 began the London Naval Conference, during which the representatives of the largest powers were to set an agreement about the future physiognomy that their respective navies would adopt. However, no agreement was reached, but rather the opposite, for the naval arms race intensified. In 1932 the World Disarmament Conference failed, in 1934 an attempt for an Italo-French agreement failed as well, also in 1934 Japan denounced the Washington and London treaties, and in 1935 Germany managed to nullify the limiting clauses of the Versailles Treaty. All of the countries involved tried to empower their navies to the maximum, building the most modern, most powerfully armed and largest units. In this regard the Japanese won the contest, for already in 1934 they began to research a new class of four huge battleships which should be (and were, albeit only two of them were completed as such) the largest units of their kind ever launched in the world. The Yamato and the Musashi entered service in 1941 and 1942 respectively, whereas the Shinano was converted into an aircraft carrier and the fourth unit was not completed because of the bad outcome of the war. These ships were true sea monsters, with their dimensions and displacement being slightly inferior than those of the first nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, armed with monstrous 460-millimeter cannons capable of firing 1,350-kilogram projectiles to a distance of almost 38 kilometers. These cannons could also open anti-aircraft fire by using special projectiles, each of which exploded sowing the air with up to 6,000 25-millimeter incendiary bullets. Also the armor was monstrous and the underwater protection was excellent. However, this did not prevent the loss of the two battleships without having given proof of their power to the enemy. The Yamato was sunk the 7th April 1945 (six months later than the Musashi), after having been hit by at least ten torpedoes and six large-caliber bombs, which destroyed the sea colossus that she was. The escorting units which survived the battle retrieved only 140 of her 3,500 crewmen.

Background: the Battle of Leyte Gulf

With the defeat suffered in the Philippine Sea, west of the Mariana Archipelago, the Japanese High Staff had to accept that the chances of a victory over the Allies had been significantly diminished. The enemy had managed to cross the external defensive barrier that Tokyo had always deemed to be unassailable. The Empire of Japan - or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as Tokyo preferred to call it - could continue existing only if it was capable of securing its own supplies of raw materials (especially petroleum). The Allies were already threatening the supply routes and this meant that the Japanese had to act quickly to prevent the strangulation of their economy. At this time, three years after the beginning of the war in the Pacific, the Japanese flag still waved in Manchuria, in a large part of China, in Formosa, in Burma, in Thailand, in Indochina, in Malaca, in Sumatra, in Java, in Borneo and in the Philippines, but in Japan nobody got their hopes up about the future of the Empire. The Americans, led by General Mac Arthur, had already finished the conquest of New Guinea while the British, led by Lord Mounbatten, were fighting for Burma. Finally the Americans, led by Admiral Nimitz, had also completed the conquest of the Mariana Archipelago. The enemy had the initiative and the Japanese forces were not in condition of starting an offensive. It was not difficult to guess that Mac Arthur and Nimitz would join their forces to invade the Philippines. In Tokyo the panic caused nervous breakdowns among the High Staff and even the Emperor himself was visibly shocked. If the Americans managed to conquer the Philippines then there would be no hope for Japan to recover, because then the American fleet would close the routes across the South China Sea, which until that time had been used to supply to Japan the petroleum sent from Singapur or Indonesia. While these routes remained open the consequences of disasters in the battlefield could be repaired, because the Japanese industry still worked at full pace. Even if a large number of tankers were being lost due to the Allied submarines, the Japanese remained confident for they could resort to long lines of tanker barges towed by merchant ships or tug boats as if they were sea trains. However, at that point the Japanese admitted their mistake regarding that the Imperial Navy had somewhat neglected the submarine weapon.

Unlike Emperor Hirohito, who had always opposed the war against United States, the Japanese generals still harbored delusions about changing the situation. In Tokyo hectic consultations gave as result the strategic plan called "Operation Sho", which was perhaps the most desperate one ever elaborated by the Japanese High Staff. In fact, "sho" means "victory" in Japanese. The plan was based in the hypothesis of an American landing in the island of Samar or Leyte, which would be supported by the whole Pacific Fleet, including heavy and light aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers. In the good former days of the Empire such a concentration of enemy warships next to the Philippines would have caused the Japanese to rejoice rather than worry, but at that point the surviving Japanese aircraft carriers had lost a significant amount of offensive power, as they had lost almost all of their aircraft and pilots in the last battles. It was this fact which suggested the most desperate feature of the battle plan. The Japanese fleet would lay a trap in front of Samar and Leyte for the American fleet, after having lured the American aircraft carriers into moving to a different place. This was simply an attempt of dividing the American fleet to facilitate the destruction of the landing force. The most troublesome aspect was to effectively lure the aircraft carriers into moving away from the landing area, but the Japanese High Staff seemed confident about the success of their strategy. The Japanese baiting fleet, which comprised two old battleships fitted with flight decks, four aircraft carriers, three cruisers and eight destroyers, would cross the waters next to Cape Engaño, the northernmost point of the Luzon island, with their flight decks empty, with the hope of being an attractive enough target for the American aircraft carriers. Since the Japanese aircraft carriers were not in condition of effectively defending themselves, some land-based flights would depart from Luzon to attack and hopefully sink the American aircraft carriers. The waste of their own aircraft carriers did not seem to the Japanese as important as the possibility of frustrating the American landing to gain enough time for reversing the current status of the war. However, the bait of Cape Engaño was not the only surprise planned against the American fleet, as Admiral Toyoda had prepared two naval squadrons which would depart from Singapur to intercept the American fleet and attack it after having flanked it. One of them, led by Admiral Shoji Nishimura, would arrive from the west through the Surigao Strait and the other, led by Admiral Takeo Kurita, would arrive from the west through the San Bernardino strait. Besides, a third naval squadron, led by Admiral Kiyode Shima, would arrive from the north before going through the straits of Surigao and Dinagat.

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In the autumn of 1944 the American plans matched the Japanese plans once again, and the two great adversaries met in the right place at the right time. Even the date of the landing in the coast of Leyte, set by the Americans to be the 20th October, matched the Japanese foresight. Based on this, the High Staff at Tokyo gave order to the four naval squadrons of departing to arrive in time to the destinations set in the thorough Japanese plan. The second Japanese squadron, led by Admiral Kurita, was formed by five battleships (Yamato, Musashi, Nagato, Kongo and Haruna), ten heavy cruisers and twenty destroyers. Meanwhile the American convoy, which comprised 420 transport ships and 157 warships, scattered throughout thousands of square kilometers on the sea, was navigating toward the Leyte Gulf. The encounter between the two fleets was deemed to be the largest naval battle which ever took place, with a total of 244 warships displacing over two millions of tonnes. Anyway, it was soon quite clear that the victory was inclined towards the American side, as the Japanese were caught during the stage of approximation, when an American submarine spotted three large enemy warships north of Borneo, and thus they lost any chance of surprising the enemy. In the night before the 22nd October, two American submarines began to follow the trails and on the evening of that same day they discovered the Japanese squadron commanded by Kurita. The 23rd October at 5:32 o'clock the two American submarines entered action, sinking the heavy cruisers Atago (the Japanese flagship) and Maya with torpedoes. Kurita narrowly saved his life and moved to a destroyer. Later on that same day Kurita appointed the superbattleship Yamato as his flagship. The Task Force 38, led by Admiral Marc Andrew Mitscher, was sent to intercept and destroy Kurita's squadron. The Task Force 38 comprised thirteen aircraft carriers, six battleships, fifteen cruisers and about sixty destroyers. This huge fleet was the largest one that an Admiral ever had to face, albeit in that moment five of its aircraft carriers were far from the battle area, refueling.

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In the flight deck of the USS Monterey the mechanics prepare the Hellcat fighter aircraft shortly before a war action. At larboard side two pilots are heating the engines of their aircraft.

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In the flight deck of a light aircraft carrier the Hellcat fighter aircraft wait for the departure signal. Soon a hell will be triggered upon the Japanese war fleet.

Divided into four groups, the Task Force 38 surveilled almost 400 kilometers on the eastern coast of the Philippines. Several reconnaissance aircraft departed from the aircraft carriers to find Kurita's squadron and as soon as this one were spotted the aerial attacks would begin. Kurita sent the land-based aircraft of the Imperial Navy to block the American offensive. The first stage of the naval battle was a pure aerial battle, on which the American fighter aircraft dominated the Japanese counterparts, to the point that at this stage the ratio of losses was respectively 10 against 167. Once the Japanese aerial curtain was dispersed, the Hellcat fighter aircraft extended at will upon Kurita's squadron. Almost all of the ships were hit and the Yamato was one of the most heavily damaged. The Musashi suffered the worst fate, as she was hit with numerous torpedoes and bombs, and sank dragging at least 1200 of her crewmen to the abyss. Kurita had not yet ventured into the San Bernardino Strait and he had already lost three large warships. Moreover, the enemy was now certain about his intentions and without a doubt they would wait for him on his path. However, the Japanese had achieved some successes: the sinking of the aircraft carrier USS Princeton and the damaging of some cruisers.

While the naval encounters took place, an American ship spotted with her radar a lonesome Japanese reconnaissance aircraft which traveled on a north-to-south course. Someone wondered whether its presence did not conceal another enemy ambush. Were they trying to take the Pacific Fleet by surprise from the right flank? Some American reconnaissance aircraft took off and one of them was so lucky that it found the Japanese aircraft when this one, flying amidst the clouds, tried to return to its base without being seen. The American pilot thought that the Japanese had discovered the American fleet and that he ran to tell it, but the truth was that he was pursuing the bait thrown by Toyoda to close the trap set in the Japanese strategic plan. Neither Halsey could imagine the truth when his observer arrived to the destination of the Japanese aircraft, north of Cape Engaño, and found there the Japanese aircraft carriers. The 24th October at 16:45 o'clock the message sent by the observer was delivered to Halsey. In the war room of the USS New Jersey the strategists tried to assess the situation. The discovery of the Japanese aircraft carriers encouraged the division of forces but everyone wondered whether this would be right or wrong. The affirmative decision was taken because the reports received indicated that Kurita's squadron had been severely damaged and because the Japanese aircraft carriers were a threat which could not be ignored. At this point nobody imagined that they were not carrying aircraft. Thus Halsey sent a part of his fleet to the north to intercept the Japanese aircraft carriers. Kurita could not know what was happening on the USS New Jersey, but he realized that the Americans suddenly reduced the intensity of their attacks. While the darkness fell upon the sea, Kurita assessed the damages suffered and gave order to continue the course towards the west.

Without being disturbed, at the end of the evening the squadron led by Admiral Nishimura, who was onboard the battleship Yamashiro, had begun to cross the strait between Mindanao and Negros towards the east. His intention was to arrive to the Surigao Strait south of Leyte and suddenly appear in front of the coast where the Marines led by Mac Arthur had landed. Isolated from the world by the silence of radio signals required to conceal his presence, Nishimura inferred from the numerous radio signals and references catched by his fleet that the great battle had already begun. This meant that the surprise factor could no longer be exploited, but nonetheless Nishimura led his squadron towards the meeting point set in the Japanese strategic plan. In the most absolute darkness, Nishimura's squadron traveled arranged into a column. He could not waste any time, for the squadron led by Admiral Shima had to follow his own. However, Nishimura did not know that the Americans had already spotted both squadrons and that the 7th Fleet led by Admiral Thomas Kinkaid was waiting for them. This fleet comprised six battleships, eight cruisers, about thirty destroyers and almost forty patrol torpedo boats. One of these spotted Nishimura's squadron shortly before 23:00 o'clock, but the Japanese discovered the enemy and began to open fire. The American withdrew covered by a smoke curtain but without giving up on the attack. The flares fired on the darkness allowed the cruisers led by Admiral Jesse Oldendorf (which formed the left wing of the 7th Fleet) to perfect their ambush. While the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso and the cruisers Mogami, Nachi and Ashigara advanced undauntly towards the American fleet, this one took positions according to the information provided by its radars.

Shortly after 2:00 o'clock some American destroyers opened fire and the Japanese replied, but while the former shot with precision the latter shot into the void. Nonetheless, Nishimura gave order to his squadron to navigate at full speed into the strait, which has a length of about 80 kilometers. It was a race towards its own destruction. Circa 4:00 o'clock, the battleships USS Tennessee, USS California, USS Maryland and USS West Virginia, which blocked the passage, opened fire. The USS West Virginia hit a Japanese ship with a 406-millimeter projectile, causing its immediate destruction with a deflagration that illuminated the area. This facilitated the work of the other battleships, which annihilated Nishimura's squadron. The patrol torpedo boats located at the other side of the strait reported that also Shima's squadron was heading west through the strait. Since the dawn was close Kinkaid requested help from the aviation. The clear morning of the 25th October witnessed the destruction of the Japanese squadrons led by Nishimura and Shima. The daylight allowed to make a count of the enemy losses: the Mogami, sunk by some bombs after having been immobilized by torpedoes and cannonades during the night; the Fuso and the Yamashiro, sunk during the night; and the Abukuma, which sank circa the noon after a long agony.

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The old battleship Fuso, which was sunk along with another three large units by salvos from American battleships during the tragic Night at Surigao. Here the battleship is shown during speed trials in May 1933, in a photograph colorized by Atsushi Yamashita.

The Americans were imbued with optimism. Kinkaid was about to announce to his fleet and to the High Staff his first report on the amazing results of the nocturnal target shooting when his attention was required by an urgent message: a Japanese squadron comprising battleships and cruisers had opened fire against the Southern Group led by Admiral Clifton Sprague, which was alone supporting the landing contingent. This group comprised sixteen escort aircraft carriers which generally were small modified units. Despite their number, they were rather vulnerable because they lacked an effective support. The Japanese attack was very dangerous, because Kurita's squadron had not been damaged as severely as it had been thought on the attack suffered the previous afternoon. Kurita had managed to force his squadron across the San Bernardino Strait during the night, avoiding the American surveillance, and at dawn his squadron headed to the south following the eastern coast of Samar. Despite the sound loss of the surprise factor, the Japanese were about to carry out the operations set in their strategic plan. Albeit the squadrons led by Nishimura and Shima had been destroyed, the aircraft carrier group led by Halsey had been lured to leave the Leyte Gulf to pursue a ghost squadron. This would allow Kurita's squadron to sow death and destruction on the landing contingent.

Sprague realized the danger in the last moment and asked help from Kinkaid, but this one was in trouble because his warships had depleted almost all of their ammunitions during the nocturnal shooting and they also had to refuel. Kinkaid forwarded Sprague's call for help to Halsey, who was still convinced that he would have to face the Japanese aircraft carriers, so he only promised a prompt return. But Kinkaid - and especially Sprague - believed that he would not return in time. At 6:58 o'clock the Yamato fired the first 460-millimeter salvo; the projectiles fell to the sea but the Americans should be worried nonetheless. The small and slow aircraft carriers were defended only by twenty destroyers, with the help of smoke curtains and some providential rains, against Kurita's squadron. During three hellish hours, only the desperate attacks from the destroyers kept the enemy at bay, for the aircraft carriers were too slow to escape from the Japanese battleships. Shortly after 8:00 o'clock, when the USS Gambier Bay had already been sunk, Sprague sent once again a destroyer group against the Japanese squadron. The very fast destroyers charged against the capital ships shooting at them with every cannon that they had. The Japanese seemed stunned by such audacity, but also because they had lost three cruisers. Suddenly, Kurita gave order to break contact with the enemy. Sprague could not believe what was happening: the enemy was withdrawing, giving up on the easy annihilation of the aircraft carriers which they had within the reach of hand.

Historians and military experts have discussed a lot about this decision taken by Kurita, generally interpreted as an escape and a resignation, besides as a disobedience of the precise orders dictated by Toyoda. Several times interrogated about this, Kurita always gave evasive answers and stated that he deemed imminent the arrival of Halsey and Kinkaid, who would have placed his squadron inside a dangerous pincer movement. Actually, Kurita's decision constituted the official admission of the failure of the Japanese strategic plan. The confirmation was given by the desperate attempt entrusted to the Kamikaze, which were used for the first time in this battle.

Astonished, the Americans could not believe what they were seeing. At first they thought that it was a coincidence: an aircraft which had been downed and fell upon an enemy ship, causing an explosion on it. But soon they realized that the coincidences were too many. Besides, the aircraft had not been hit and still carried their bombs when falling upon the enemy ships. The Kamikaze brought havoc to the aircraft carriers led by Sprague. The USS Saint Lo was sunk by a suicide attack and another three aircraft carriers were hit: the USS Kitkum Bay, the USS Kalinin Bay and the USS Santee. Meanwhile, shortly after 11:00 o'clock, Halsey, who ignored that Kurita had withdrawn his squadron from the battle area, ordered Vice Admiral Willis A. Lee to head towards Samar to help Sprague.

Before the sunrise, Halsey sent 180 aircraft to Cape Engaño to search for the Japanese aircraft carriers which had been spotted the previous night. The contact took place at 7:35 o'clock, when a group of Zero fighter aircraft (of which there were 120 exemplars onboard Ozawa's aircraft carrier) desperately tried to intercept the American aircraft. In a matter of minutes the Japanese aircraft were shot down and the aircraft carriers led by Ozawa were left at the mercy of the American aircraft. The first wave of attackers sank the Chitose, which was destroyed by a cluster of 454-kilogram bombs, and a lesser ship. The subsequent waves sank the Zuiho and the Zuikaku and turned the Chiyoda into a floating piece of scrap. The most dramatic circumstance for the Japanese was that their aircraft were being sacrificed uselessly, precisely because the phase which led to this outcome was the only one which was going on as expected according to the Japanese strategic plan. Kurita had failed to annihilate the naval force which was supporting the landing contingent, and the aviation based in Luzon and Formosa had not exploited the circumstance of having the American aircraft carriers within their reach.

The desperate plan of dividing and destroying the American fleet which guarded the landing operations on the Leyte Gulf had ended in a catastrophic way, with the loss of four aircraft carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers, three light cruisers and ten destroyers. This represented a total amount of almost 300,000 tonnes, which exceeded the fourth part of the overall losses of the Imperial Japanese Navy since the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. After that moment the Imperial Japanese Navy would play only a minor role in the defense of the national territory. It was a sound victory for the Americans, but over time the Admirals realized that numerous mistakes had prevented that the United States Navy had annihilated the whole Imperial Japanese Navy in that very moment. The night after withdrawing from the Leyte Gulf Kurita's squadron had managed to cross the San Bernardino Strait, and this allowed it to reach the Japanese resupply base at Brunei. The 26th October Kurita received from the High Staff at Tokyo the order of returning to the Leyte Gulf to finish the battle that he had left prematurely. But his squadron was spotted by the American aviation while heading to the Philippines, so he decided to turn around and flee back to Brunei.

Sinking of the Musashi

In the morning of the 24th October 1944 Admiral Kurita was in the command bridge of the superbattleship Yamato, commanding the Japanese fleet which navigated towards the San Bernardino strait, when a raid of American aircraft attacked it. This naval force had been already spotted by American submarines, which had already sunk the heavy cruisers Takao and Maya. However, Kurita was determined to lead his fleet towards Samar and Leyte, to annihilate there, in a decisive surface battle, the American fleet which assisted the landing contingent. He also had to destroy, with salvos from his naval artillery, the bridgeheads and return the Philippines to Japan. The Commander was in a good mood because he expected that the trap laid for the Americans by the baiting aircraft carriers worked well, and above all because he had in his fleet the two largest battleships ever built, the Yamato - back then the flagship of the fleet - and the Musashi, sister of the Yamato. However, the construction of the two superbattleships had raised fierce controversies among the High Staff of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Some stated that the era of battleships was over and that only aircraft carriers should be built. But a solomonic decision was made: at least two battleships and numerous aircraft carriers would be built. The Yamato had a lightweight displacement of 64,000 tonnes and a length over a quarter of kilometer. She was armed with nine 460-millimeter cannons, six 155-millimeter cannons, twenty-four 127-millimeter anti-aircraft cannons and nearly one hundred of fast-firing 25-millimeter cannons. She could develop a speed of 27.5 knots and had a complement of 3,332 men. The Musashi had entered service one year later and had a somewhat more modern equipment. The 460-millimeter cannons were the largest cannons ever installed on a ship and they could fire special shrapnel and incendiary anti-aircraft projectiles called "San-shiki-dan". As the Yamato, the Musashi was considered to be unsinkable.

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The battleship Musashi is shown leaving Brunei for the Battle of Leyte Gulf the 22nd October 1944, in a photograph colorized by Atsushi Yamashita.

But in the morning of that 24th October, the attacks from the American naval aviation achieved the incredible feat of sinking the Musashi. The agony of the superbattleship has been narrated in detail and not without emotion by American historian John Toland on the basis of testimonials from survivors, especially from first-class Corporal Shiro Hosoya, who witnessed the disaster from the open spotting top on the second command bridge, at mid height on the huge structure vaguely shaped as a pagoda which supported the first command bridge. Hosoya was the signals chief and he only had to stay there waiting for orders to transmit. The first wave of aircraft (which had departed from the carriers USS Intrepid and USS Cabot) attacked Kurita's fleet at 8:37 o'clock and covered the two superbattleships with a rainfall of bombs and torpedoes. It seemed that the Yamato had been hit, but she emerged unescathed from the columns of water which rose around her. All of the anti-aircraft batteries fired at once creating a barrier of fire around the superbattleships, but unexpectedly two explosions made the Musashi to tremble. She had been hit by a bomb and a torpedo. However, she continued navigating as if nothing had happened. The American aircraft withdrew and the Japanese fleet retook its formation. But at noon a new wave of aircraft attacked Kurita's fleet and the Musashi was hit by another three torpedoes. However, all of the damages were put under control and she continued navigating as if she were unscathed. Around 13:30 o'clock a third wave of aircraft (which had departed from the carriers USS Essex and USS Lexington) attacked the Japanese fleet once again. A few Japanese land-based flights departed to intercept the attackers, but they were shot down. The hammering of bombs was dangerously close when Koshino, the fire control chief on the Musashi, asked permission to fire the 460-millimeter cannons (each of which could fire over 1400 kilograms of shrapnel against the enemy aircraft formations), but the permission was denied. The High Command wanted to keep the heavy artillery pieces intact for the imminent surface battle which was intended in the Japanese battle plan. Four bombs destroyed the bridges of the Musashi and another torpedo opened a breach in the hull. The superbattleship was already truly hurt and she had to decrease her speed. Kurita looked at her through his binoculars and gave order to the fleet to decrease the speed to 22 knots, to prevent the Musashi from losing contact with it. Meanwhile, the slower speed had rendered her more vulnerable and the American aircraft fluttered around her like birds of prey. Sixty-five aircraft which had departed from the carriers USS Enterprise and USS Franklin arrived when the Musashi was already heeled. Koshino finally obtained permission to fire the 460-millimeter cannons, and the Musashi trembled with this last action of pride which shot down more than one of the attackers. A salvo of three torpedoes hit the larboard side of the hull and a bomb fell upon the pagoda-shaped superstructure, killing everyone in the first command bridge. Only the Commander, who had left the place for a moment, was unescathed. The Musashi still tried to accomplish her mission but the inclination was increasing. An order to inundate the right side of the hull was given, but at that point there was no electrical power to actuate the pumps. Hosoya received the order of transmitting a message to the Yamato, which was navigating away from her sister: "Musashi in conditions of navigating at 15 knots. Heeled around 15 degrees to the larboard side. A bomb has fallen in the first command bridge; all of the officers are dead. Five bombs and twelve torpedoes have hit the ship. The Commander is still alive."

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The battleship Musashi is hit by a bomb during the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea the 24th October 1944, in a photograph colorized by Atsushi Yamashita.

At 15:20 o'clock a new wave of aircraft (which had departed from the carriers USS Intrepid, USS Cabot and USS Essex) joined the saraband of the aircraft which had arrived from the carriers USS Franklin and USS Enterprise, whose fuel was about to be depleted. The anti-aircraft artillery of the Japanese warships continued creating a barrier of fire, but the number of aircraft finding a gap on the barrier was increasing. New explosions made the Musashi to tremble and everyone understood that the fate of the superbattleship had been already sealed. The water already reached the decks when the attackers withdrew. A heavy silence fell upon the Musashi, broken only by the crackle from the fires and the laments from the wounded. Suddenly, the mariners shouted "Banzai!" and someone asked about the motive of the exaltation. "The enemy fleet has been destroyed", a mariner said. "Who said that to you?", he was inquired. "The fire control chief", he answered. The false rumor quickly ran across the Musashi and the fighting spirit of the crew remained high despite the seventeen bombs and nineteen torpedoes which had hit her. Kurita's fleet was already far away on the horizon and Hosoya received the order of transmitting another message: "Speed six knots, possibility of maneuvering. Severe damages. What should we do?". From the Yamato they answered that the Musashi should leave the battle area escorted by two destroyers. The inclination towards the starboard side was increasing, even if all of the personnel had gathered on the bow, along with all of the objects which could be moved there. The orders from the Yamato stated that the Musashi should be stranded in the nearest island "to be turned into a ground battery". It was the end. The sunset was coming. The onboard books and codes were soaked with gasoline and burned. Some packages, ballasted with machine guns, were thrown to the sea. The inclination of the Musashi already reached 20 degrees. Commander Inoguchi wrote his testament in a notebook and entrusted it to an officer along with his saber and a portrait of the Emperor. In the testament, Inoguchi asked forgiveness to the Emperor for his mistake on having been favorable to the construction of the superbattleships. The end was approaching and Inoguchi gave order to the officers of occupying a life boat. The Lieutenant Commander asked permission to die with the ship, but Inoguchi forbade him to proceed like that. He said: "Damned madman! My responsibility is so big that not even death will erase it, and because of this I must share the fate of the ship, but the Lieutenant Commander is responsible of the salvation and safety of the crew, and must make possible that some day they get onboard of the second or third Musashi to avenge the defeat of today". Later Inoguchi called Hosoya and said to him: "Thank you for your services, signalman. Behave the best possible until the end." Then he gave to him a bag with money and cupcakes. At 19:15 o'clock the Commander gave order to rollcall the crew and, while the bugler played the national anthem, the flag was hauled down and ceremoniously wrapped around the waist of an experienced swimmer. The ship was by then so heeled over that everything which was on the deck began to roll, including the corpses of the men killed by the bombs. The Lieutenant Commander shouted: "All of the crew leave the ship! Every man for himself!" Many men ran barefoot on the rolling hull before jumping to the sea and swimming franctically to avoid being dragged by the imminent suction that the sinking hull would cause. The Musashi rose her stern before disappearing on the sea and four destroyers began to rescue the survivors.

Background: the Battle of Okinawa

As the reconquest of the Pacific approached its end, and at the moment of preparing for the last assault before the invasion of Japan, the Army and the Navy of United States agreed to share at equal parts the honor and the burden of conquering the Okinawa island. Thus the supreme command of an amphibious landing operation was entrusted for the first time to an Army General, Simon Bolivar Buckner, who was to be assisted by the two greatest experts on this kind of operations: Admiral Raymond Spruance and Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commanders of the 5th Fleet and the amphibious forces, respectively. Buckner was in command of the whole 10th Army, which comprised the 24th Army Corps (four divisions) and the 3rd Marine Corps (two divisions), with a total of 180,000 soldiers. Taking into account that the Navy had assigned 1,320 ships to the conquest of Okinawa, the amount of troops involved rose to 548,000. It is not an exaggeration to say that in Okinawa the Americans made their greatest effort on the Pacific War.

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The American landing barges approach the coast of Okinawa. In this operation, which initially seemed one of easy development, took part over half million of people.

The commander of Okinawa, General Mitsuru Ushiyima, was very aware of the difficulty of the mission which had been assigned to him, as the successive defeats inflicted to the Japanese forces in the Pacific spoke favorably of the American landing forces. How to judge the fact that the garrisons of the islands routinely ended the encounters with the enemy by seeking their own annihilation in glorified but useless Banzai charges? Only one consideration imbued Ushiyima with hope: the fact that none of the defeated garrisons had had support from the dwindling Japanese aviation, whereas Okinawa could be defended by the aircraft based at Formosa and Kyushu. Ushiyima thought that they would difficult the approximation of the large American fleet, which was necessary for a large-scale landing.

Notwithstanding, even if the Americans managed to reach the solid ground the garrison of the island would be in position of fighting quite well, for it comprised two infantry divisions and a mixed brigade, with a total of 85,000 soldiers, to which Ushiyima managed to add about 20,000 improvised soldiers enlisted among the civilian population of Okinawa, which were assigned to territorial guard duties. According to the numbers the disparity of forces was great, even greater regarding the support elements, but the Americans should not underestimate the enemy. The terrible experience suffered few months before in the desolate volcanic fields of Iwo Jima gave a good demonstration of what extreme resistance meant for the Japanese. The reports gathered by the aerial reconnaissance pointed to the possibility of repeating that experience. However, the Americans were cautious and conquered the islets located in front of the western shores of Okinawa (Kerama and Keise), inflicting a considerable blow to the defensive plan devised by Ushiyima, who had assigned to the troops stationed on the islets the mission of attacking the landing contingent by the rear.

The landing had been planned for the 1st April, but simultaneously with the conquest of the islets the 5th Fleet was navigating between the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. This encouraged Ushiyima to send Kamikaze aircraft (Zero fighter aircraft loaded with explosives) to attack the large American warships. The American fighter aircraft and the barrier of fire created by the anti-aircraft cannons did not deter the Kamikaze from diving against the enemy ships. The most spectacular result was the severe damage inflicted to the cruiser USS Indianapolis, onboard which was Admiral Spruance. Few hours after this raid, at 8:30 o'clock on the 1st April, five American divisions took the beaches of Okinawa. Surprisingly, the Japanese did not react to this, and during the morning the landing craft disembarked hundreds and hundreds of soldiers. Before the night not less than 50,000 of them had set foot on Okinawa, forming a beachhead spanning over 10 kilometers. This happened for three days.

The night of the first day a flock of Japanese fighter-bomber aircraft attacked the American fleet and the Kamikaze were used once again. A British squadron, which for the first time was supporting an American military operation in the Pacific, was attacked as well and a Kamikaze managed to crash against the isle of the aircraft carrier HMS Indefatigable. The Japanese resistance did not betray its presence until the 4th April, when the expeditionary force had already divided the island into two parts. Ushiyima had thought that the most appropriate time for an all-out attack using all the land, sea and air forces would be when all of the troops and the materials had been disambarked, for the destruction of not only the troops but also the material would force the enemy to give up on the conquest of Okinawa.

Ushiyima's plan was not worse than those followed by his fellows in Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Eniwetok, Guam or Iwo Jima, and since the Japanese had been defeated in all of those places he had the right to experiment with something different. The truth is that this tactic had been practically imposed to him because of the desperate situation of his forces. The Japanese were with the water up to their necks. They did not have a proper Air Force because there were no spare parts or pilots available for the surviving aircraft, neither a proper Navy because only a few important warships had survived, among which there were no aircraft carriers, nor islands where to fight the enemy, so the subsequent battle would be fought in the homeland. The only hope of the Japanese was to succeed in annihilating the American landing troops with the simultaneous land, sea and air attack that the Japanese High Command had devised to support Ushiyima's plan. This success should be enough to discourage the Americans from assaulting the Japanese mainland, at least for some time.

The American forces were not fooled by the silence that the Japanese garrison kept. The 5th April the Japanese resistance became stronger and several clues indicated to the American High Command that the counterattack would be launched the 6th or the 8th April. The destroyers were scattered in ample sectors so they could detect the enemy attacks with enough anticipation and the reconnaissance aircraft patrolled the sea for hundreds of miles around. On the afternoon of the 4th April, these aircraft spotted in the Kyushu island airfields crowded with aircraft ready to take off. Admiral Spruance promptly sent the bomber aircraft of the 5th Fleet to destroy the enemy aircraft before they took off. The bombing took place on the morning of the 6th April and the reconnaissance aircraft reported that it had been successful. Apparently, at least 200 aircraft had been destroyed. It is difficult to say how reliable that report was. The fact is that few hours after the bombing over 700 Kamikaze took off.

Having been discovered, the Japanese quickly readjusted their previous plan, which consisted of an attack effectuated simultaneously by a "special surface attack force" and by hundreds of Kamikaze and bomber aircraft departing from Kyushu and Formosa. Now the attack would not be a simultaneous one, because when the aerial force took off the surface force was still weighing anchors to depart from Tokuyama. This prevented that the results of the attack were decisive. Besides, the attackers were spotted by the destroyers located 70 miles away from the coast of Okinawa, so when they arrived they were received with an imposing barrier of fire. The American anti-aircraft gunners and fighter pilots calculated that they had downed almost 250 aircraft, which was not surprising because the attacking force lacked any protection from fighter aircraft. Despite this, the Japanese attack achieved important results, especially due to the action of the Kamikaze, which this time were used in large scale. In the first counting the Americans lamented the loss of minesweepers, transport ships and destroyers, as well as severe damages to one battleship, nine destroyers and a dozen of ships comprising escort ships and minesweepers.

In the island, the counterattack launched by the Japanese garrison could only progress slowly and it seemed unable to throw the landing forces back to the sea. Since the Americans had already disembarked in the island all of the necessary materials the landing forces were able to present a fierce resistance. Now Ushiyima's plan was turning against his own forces. However, the summit of the futility of the Japanese efforts was represented by the "special surface attack force", pompously called 2nd Fleet, which was forced to fight the last naval battle of the Second World War. This fleet had been gathered with a lot of effort and after many doubts. The High Command of the Imperial Japanese Navy, a branch of the Armed Forces which had contributed so generously to the gigantic war effort of Japan, being the absolute protagonist of so many memorable encounters, had already decided that there was no real possibility to resist against the enemy. Any attempt to comfront the American naval forces would mean the useless sacrifice of the units which were still afloat and the certain death of their crews. The disaster suffered by the aircraft carrier squadron at Cape Engaño had been badly digested by the Navy because of the useless sacrifice imposed, but in the last moment the pressure was so high that nobody dared to refuse the request.

The defenders of Okinawa, who were tiredlessly chased by the Americans, did not have another alternative either. In the first days of May, General Ushiyima triggered a desperate and bloody counterattack supported by terrible aerial attacks performed by suicide pilots. Particular places of the island became famous because of the hundreds of soldiers who died there. Meanwhile the Americans were preparing for ending the conquest of the island. A month after the landings the engineers had widened roads to facilitate the transit of the thousands of vehicles which had been disembarked, organized supply bases, installed anti-aircraft batteries and laid telephone lines linking all of the facilities of the Army and the Navy.

In a cave located about 30 meters beneath the Shuri Castle, the chief of Ushiyima's High Staff, Army Corps General Isamu Cho, was demanding that a general counterattack was launched. His plan was ambitious, complex and difficult. It consisted of trying an eight-kilometer wedge-shaped advance across the American lines, taking advantage of a massive Kamikaze attack against the American warships, supported by tactical bomber aircraft. Two regiments, preceded by a heavy artillery fire, would depart to charge to the east of the Road 5, while a third regiment would descend from the Maeda Ridge and, with considerable support from tanks, would press through the road up to the highlands located behind it. The 46th Independent Mixed Brigade would advance almost one kilometer before turning to the left, towards the western coast of the island. To surprise the enemy, also two amphibious landings would be effectuated behind the American lines, one in the western coast and another one in the eastern coast.

In the dawn of the 3rd May the Japanese artillery began to hammer the enemy frontline and Kamikaze aircraft attacked the American ships, sinking the destroyer USS Little and the armored landing craft LSM-95, and damaging another four ships. Shortly after midnight an attack from six bomber aircraft against the rearguard of the 10th Army happened at the same time than the advance of the barges carrying the forces which would perform the two amphibious landings on the western and eastern coasts. Because of a mistake, in the western coast the amphibious forces landed in the vicinity of a Marine company. Alarmed by the "Banzai! shouts, the Marines greeted the astonished Japanese with a deadly concentrated fire from mortars, machine guns and rifles. The few who survived this hammering were later chased, evicted from their hideouts and killed. The amphibious force which advanced on the eastern coast was sighted by an American sea patrol, which illuminated the area with flares. The largest part of the barges were destroyed and the few dozens of soldiers that reached the shore were killed. One hour before the dawn, the Japanese artillery fire reached a deafening intensity which continued for over half an hour. Then, two red flares rose towards the sky: it was the attack signal. The Japanese infantry advanced and charged with despair. On the right flank two thousands of soldiers were taken by surprise by the American artillery fire. The survivors tried to advance but they were systematically killed in the plains.

The success of the central attack relied in the support from tanks, but since the precise artillery fire had immobilized all of the medium tanks, only about ten light tanks managed to get ahead the infantry vanguard, constituted by a battalion of six hundred soldiers commanded by Captain Koichi Ito. At dawn, they opened a breach in the American lines but then they were stopped by machine gun fire. The light tanks tried to advance but the American artillery fine-tuned its precision and destroyed them one by one. At that point Ito decided to continue without the support from the tanks and led his already decimated battalion towards the first target, a group of hills located less than two kilometers north-east of the Maeda Ridge, near the city of Tanaburu. Later, during the morning, the fragmented news which arrived to the Headquarters of the 32nd Army talked about extraordinary victories achieved, eliciting enthusiasm and celebrations in the cave beneath the ruins of the Shuri Castle. Actually, nobody except Ito had managed to effectuate a true advance, and because of this he was assigned the assault of the hill upon Tanaburu for that same night. Ito and his soldiers advanced along the sides of the Road 5 until they were blocked by the enemy artillery fire. Having at his disposal the support from tanks, for these had advanced shrouded by the darkness, this time Ito and his soldiers were able to continue. During the violent artillery fire which ensued six tanks were destroyed but Ito and his soldiers managed to cover the two painful kilometers up to Tanaburu, to the other side of the American lines. Ito gave order to mine the road which crossed the town and at dawn he had already prepared a defensive line in the slopes of the hill. Then he communicated via radio, without encoding the message (for the man in charge of the keys had died), that he and 450 of his soldiers had reached the target. He received the order of staying there.

In the dawn of the 5th May it was evident even for the impetuous Cho that the attack that he had fostered and sustained had been a failure. In that moment not even he glimpsed any hope for the survivors in Okinawa. The defeat was certain.

Ito was still stationed upon Tanaburu but he was pressed from every side. During the day a hundred of his men had been hit by flamethrowers, mortar fire and hand grenades. During the following morning the American attacks continued and were repelled with great losses and sacrifices. Out of the six hundred men that had begun the offensive only about one hundred fifty remained. Ito was preparing to die when a paper note wrapped around a stone fell on his trench. It was from his radio operator, who had just received the order of withdrawing the detachment. Ito said farewell to the wounded, distributing hand grenades among them, and then he reunited the useful men at the foot of the hill. At midnight they moved to the south shrouded by the darkness, but those two kilometers of enemy territory which they had to cross demanded a high tax: only Ito and a dozen of men managed to pass by.

The Japanese had attacked with all of the means that they had managed to gather, but they were easily annihilated by the 24th Army Corps commanded by General John Reed Hodge. This success happened at the same time than a much more important one which took place in Europe. In the noon of the 8th May all of the American artillery pieces fired three salvos because Germany had surrendered.

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Albeit the outcome of the war was already clear (as Japan no longer had a war fleet), the soldiers of the Rising Sun continued fighting with extraordinary and heroical fanatism to keep the enemy far from the homeland. Okinawa was the last redoubt of the metropolitan territory. The Marines required 82 days to conquer it.

To defeat the Japanese on a bloody and exposed charge was one thing and to evict them from the defense points excavated in the terrain was another one, much costlier and deadlier. The Maeda Ridge had become a sort of bloody carousel with both parts advancing and withdrawing successively. An American infantry battalion, the 1st from the 307th Infantry Regiment, lost more than half of its effectives, including, during thirty-six hours, eight company chiefs. The Japanese suffered even greater losses. For example, Captain Shimura arrived to the ridge with 600 soldiers but later he ended with just 150, many of which were severely wounded. Still, he refused to withdraw, even if he had received the order to do so. He wanted to die where the largest part of his soldiers had been annihilated. The regiment insisted on his withdrawal and a High Staff officer from the 24th Division sent a codified message to him saying that he "would find other suitable battlefields where to die". Shimura talked to his soldiers about the order that he had received and told them that he would stay there to lead a guerilla action. "Whoever wants to stay here can do it. We will stay in this ridge up to the death". Many of the soldiers stayed there and the rest withdrew, leaving the Maeda Ridge to the Americans.

After the conquest of the Maeda Ridge, the American offensive slowly extended throughout the whole island. Two Marine divisions (the 3rd Amphibious Army Corps) held the eastern flank. After a hard battle, the 6th Division had conquered the Sugar Loaf Hill, which was the western hinge of the whole defensive line, located about one kilometer and half from Shuri. The 1st Division, which fought since the Battle of Guadalcanal, advanced through the Wana Canal, a narrow and rocky pass which led to the center of the ex-capital. Beyond, to the east, up to the coast, the three divisions of the 24th Army Corps, advancing slowly, conquered several hills to the east of Shuri. In the sunset of the 21st May the town was rammed from three sides but the combats were stopped by the darkness and later by torrential rains. The Wana Canal became a true swamp. The tanks and the amphibious elements fought with the mud. Along the whole frontline the holes excavated in the ground began to crumble and those located in the flat ground had to be constantly repaired like boats which leak water. The curtain of rain continued for almost a whole week. Few victuals could be delivered to the frontline and it was impossible to sleep under that continuous downpour. The dead could not be buried and they were left rotting. Despite the letup from the rain, General Ushiyima decided to leave Shuri. The 62nd and 24th Divisions along with the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, which formed the bulk of his forces, had been thwarted by the endless fire from the field and naval artillery, the bombings and the assaults from the enemy infantry and tanks. Ushiyima rebutted the protests against his withdrawal stating that the attempt of staying in Shuri would only accelerate the fall of Okinawa.

The Battle of Okinawa would last until the last days of June with a bloodshed. In the last Japanese trenches the American soldiers would see numerous officers and soldiers killing themselves. General Ushiyima, dressed with a full-dress uniform, ate with his second-in-command, who was dressed with a kimono. Then both went outdoors and killed themselves. The balance of casualties was frightening. The Americans had 12,000 dead and 37,000 wounded, while the Japanese had over 100,000 dead. But for the first time the Americans managed to capture a considerable amount of prisoners (over 7,000 including officers and soldiers), which showed an important change in the attitude of the Japanese.

The conquest of the island had required 82 days of battling. It had begun cautiously and gradually increased in ruthlessness until becoming the bloodiest battle of the whole Pacific War. Even the balance of material losses was exceptional. The Americans had lost 763 aircraft as well as 18 ships (one aircraft carrier, twelve destroyers and five units including minesweepers, transport ships and landing craft) from the Kamikaze attacks. These were also responsible of having damaged, more or less severely, another 198 ships (among them eleven aircraft carriers, nine battleships and five cruisers), of which 19 could not be used again. On the Japanese side the balance was even severer. The civilian population of Okinawa suffered the loss of over 75,000 inhabitants. This was the price paid to open for the Americans the path to the invasion of Japan.

Sinking of the Yamato

The only element of actual strenght in the 2nd Fleet was constituted by the superbattleship Yamato. The rest of the squadron was merely an escort for the impressive warship, which once was Yamamoto's flagship and still was the largest battleship ever built. Apart from the light cruiser Yahagi, the rest of the 2nd Fleet comprised only three destroyer flotillas with a total of eight units. The Yamato had just been repaired from the damages suffered during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and she was consciously sent to the slaughter in a desperate attempt to block somehow the American fleet. The battle plan arranged by Vice Admiral Seichi Ito, Commander of the 2nd Fleet, set that the Yamato and the Yahagi should arrive, along with the eight destroyers, to the east of Okinawa in the late night of the 8th April, paying attention to not get too close to the American aircraft carriers. The order was the simplest one: to shoot at the enemy units to sink the largest possible number of them.

The mission assigned to the superbattleship was a hopeless one. Like that of the Kamikaze, this was also a suicide mission which would have no impact in the Battle of Okinawa. Unlike the destroyers, which had received a normal load of fuel, the Yamato and the Yahagi only carried enough fuel for reaching Okinawa. It was intended to strand the Yamato in the coast of Okinawa to use her as a coastal battery. Once the ammunitions of the Yamato were depleted, her complement of almost 3,500 men should join the garrison of the island to fight until the bitter end. Few minutes before the departure, Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, chief of Toyoda's High Staff, got onboard the Yamato to transmit this order and say farewell to the complement. The mariners waved their caps and shouted "Banzai!".

yamato_battleship_1941.jpg

The battleship Yamato is shown during sea trials at Sukumo the 30th October 1941.

The Americans were warned about the departure of the 2nd Fleet by a reconnaissance aircraft which flew over Tukuyama while Kusaka was talking to the mariners. However, the numerous submarines which were put into alarm state could not locate the 2nd Fleet. This one was eventually spotted the following day at 12:34 o'clock by reconnaissance aircraft sent from the American aircraft carriers. The first wave of aircraft which attacked the Yamato had the chance to get cover by flying above the low clouds. After a couple of minutes two bombs damaged the low-caliber anti-aircraft cannons located next to the aft secondary cannon turret, and shortly after a torpedo opened a huge hole on the larboard side of the bow. Until that moment the 2nd Fleet had not fired a single projectile against the American fleet, which had not been able to locate because the effort had been focused in the attempt to repel the aerial attack. But, regardless of how numerous the anti-aircraft batteries of the Yamato were, they were unable to stop the enemy aircraft without the help of fighter aircraft. Shortly after the Yamato began to be flooded, a torpedo hit the cruiser Yahagi, stopping her instantly. Meanwhile, the destroyer Hamakaze was sunk with her whole complement onboard, including Commander Isami Mukoi.

The situation of the 2nd Fleet was critical and Vice Admiral Ito, assuming the defeat, gave order to reach Okinawa to strand the Yamato and disembark her complement there. But they had no time to do anything. Shortly after 13:00 o'clock, a second wave of aircraft coming from the east, the west and the south-east fell upon the 2nd Fleet. Clusters of bombs fell over the Yamato and shook her. Then two torpedoes which hit on her larboard side made her to tremble and silenced the radio station. Two of the surviving destroyers, the Yukikaze and the Fuyutsuki, desperately tried to protect the superbattleship by navigating in circles around her. The sea boiled because of the great amount of explosions but the Yamato continued to fire from the largest part of her artillery pieces. Then a flock of twenty torpedo bombers began to dance around her. Since some of the artillery pieces on the larboard side had ceased to fire the torpedo bombers attacked from that side. Three torpedoes hit the Yamato and rendered the secondary rudder inoperative due to the inclination. With haste, the crew maneuvered to decrease the inclination and render the rudder operative again, but the draught had been increased by the flooding and this slowed the movements of the Yamato, which made easier for the American aircraft to hit her. Once again clusters of bombs fell over the superbattleship, causing devastation in diverse places of the superstructures, while some torpedoes opened new holes in the sides of the hull. Circa 14:00 o'clock the speed of the Yamato had been reduced to seven knots. Fifteen minutes later, the tenth torpedo stopped her with a frightening explosion. This contundent action against the superbattleship was being performed by a force of 386 aircraft sent from the aircraft carriers commanded by Admiral Marc Andrew Mitscher.

Admiral Toyoda received the notification of the sinking of the Yamato through the radio of one of the three destroyers which miraculously had managed to survive the deluge of bombs. The mission of the 2nd Fleet had ended without any success but the Japanese were comforted by the idea of that sacrifice being not in vain. In their attempt of getting as close as possible to the 2nd Fleet, the Americans had unwisely placed their aircraft carriers too close to the Japanese airbases, which made possible other Kamikaze attacks. Later a long controversy developed among the Japanese experts and the American historians in respect of the desperate mission assigned to the Yamato. The opinion of the largest part of them was that it was a huge mistake, because the largest battleship in the world should not be sent to battle without a minimum of aerial cover. Later Admiral Toyoda, the maximum responsible of the action, explained that they "should do anything possible to help the soldiers that were fighting in Okinawa. We had to venture into that reckless mission. Even if that decision of mine could be now condemned, I do not try to say anything to justify myself. I only want to add that in that moment I did not have another alternative."

The battleships of the Yamato class

The battleships of the Yamato class were the largest and most powerful ever built, and also the only ones armed with cannons of caliber above 406 millimeters (16 inches). According to the terms of the Washington and London treaties, Japan was obliged to having a lesser amount of important ships than United States or Great Britain. Albeit the 31st December 1936 Japan refused to ratify the treaty, it could not build enough battleships and aircraft carriers simultaneously due to the scarcity of suitable facilities for large-scale naval production. The capacity of construction was mistakenly overloaded and this gave as result significant delays in the completion of battleships and aircraft carriers. Because of this, when they were most needed, the former were unavailable and the latter were insufficient.

The size of the battleships of the future Yamato class was determined by that of the battleships that the Japanese thought that the Americans were going to build, mistakenly believing that they would insist in ships capable of crossing the Panama Canal, to be able to quickly move from the Atlantic to the Pacific and viceversa. When in March 1935 the first blueprints of the Yamato class were ready, the Japanese thought that the Americans would be limited to battleships with a standard displacement of 64,000 tonnes, cannons of caliber 406 millimeters (16 inches) and a speed not exceeding 23 knots. The first blueprints were made for a ship with a standard displacement of 70,610 tonnes and a speed of 31 knots, which was too large even for the Japanese, so the size was reduced and the speed was limited to 27 knots. Twenty-three different designs were made before the last one was accepted in March 1937. In the beginning it was thought to use Diesel engines to achieve a greater operational range with less fuel. Some alternative designs were prepared to use either a Diesel main engine or Diesel auxiliary engines with steam turbine propulsion. However, the idea was discarded in the final design because the Diesel engines installed in other Japanese warships had demonstrated to be extraordinarily unreliable.

The shape of the hull of the battleships of the Yamato class was an unusual one. If comparing its draught with that of the contemporary battleships built by other countries, it would seem that these could not have used the same anchorages that the Imperial Japanese Navy used. The relatively shallow draught caused that the hull had a great beam. The bulbous bow reduced the drag about 8 percent at full speed. To save weight the armored belt was inclined 20 degrees from the vertical plane, so it was integrated as an external hull surface. The armored belt was designed to withstand impacts from 460-millimeter (18.1-inch) cannons, but the armored citadel was relatively short, so the ends of the hull were very vulnerable. The underwater protection was comparatively poor for battleships of such size. Weight was saved also by welding the pieces which formed the hull. However, these ships had long-barrel secondary armament against surface targets and short-barrel heavy anti-aircraft armament, instead of dual-purpose secondary armament to save weight. The 155-millimeter (6.1-inch) triple cannon turrets coming from the light cruisers of the Mogami class constituted a weak point, for their armor was not reinforced when they were installed in the battleships. The blast of the main armament was so intense that the light anti-aircraft cannons were protected by covers and the boats were sheltered in two stern underdeck hangars, which flanked the aircraft hangar.

The Musashi was almost identical to the Yamato and both ships usually operated together. The Musashi was sunk by aircraft from an American aircraft carrier the 24th October 1944. On her last travel the Yamato had fuel only for reaching the battle area. She was attacked and sunk within two hours the 7th April 1945. The Shinano was completed as an aircraft carrier, but she was sunk by the submarine USS Archerfish even before her sea trials had begun. The construction of the fourth unit, called No. 111, was cancelled when less than 30 percent remained to be completed. The scrapped material was used to build aircraft carriers.

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The Yamato as she was during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Note the numerous anti-aircraft mountings and the stern facilities (rails, catapults and a crane) for the aircraft carried (the seaplanes Mitsubishi F1M2 "Pete" and Aichi E13A1 "Jake").

Class: Yamato (3 units, one reconverted into aircraft carrier)

Type: Battleship

Shipyard: Kure (Yamato); Mitsubishi, Nagasaki (Musashi)

Development (Yamato): Ordered in 1937, keel laid the 4th November 1937, launched the 8th August 1940, completed the 16th December 1941, sunk the 7th April 1945

Development (Musashi): Ordered in 1937, keel laid the 29th March 1938, launched the 11th November 1941, completed the 5th August 1942, sunk the 24th October 1944

Length (total): 263 meters

Length (in the waterline): 256 meters

Beam (total): 38.9 meters

Beam (in the waterline): 36.9 meters

Draught: 11.7 meters

Armament (as built): 9 x 460-millimeter (45 calibers) cannon, 12 x 155-millimeter (55 calibers) cannon, 12 x 127-millimeter (40 calibers) cannon, 24 x 25-millimeter cannon, 4 x 13.2-millimeter machine gun

Armament (in 1945): 9 x 460-millimeter (45 calibers) cannon, 12 x 155-millimeter (55 calibers) cannon, 24 x 127-millimeter (40 calibers) cannon, 146 x 25-millimeter cannon, 4 x 13.2-millimeter machine gun

Armor: 100-410 millimeters in armored belt, 300-340 millimeters in bulkheads, 200-230 millimeters in armored deck, 380-560 millimeters in main barbettes, 190-650 millimeters in main turrets, 25 millimeters in secondary turrets, 500 millimeters in conning tower

Displacement (standard): 65,020 tonnes

Displacement (normal): 70,605 tonnes

Displacement (full load): 73,970 tonnes

Propulsion plant: 12 Kanpon boilers, 4 shafts actuated by Kanpon steam turbines, developing 153,000 horsepower

Maximum speed: 27.5 knots (50.9 kilometers/hour)

Operational range: 6,054 nautical miles (11,212 kilometers) at 16 knots

Fuel load: 6,400 tonnes

Complement: 2,200 in 1941; 3,500 in 1945



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Categories: Naval Warfare - World War Two - 20th Century - [General] - [General]

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Website: Military History

Article submitted: 2015-02-03

Article updated: 2024-12-20


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